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EXHIBITS LIST 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS: 
There was no hearing, so no reporter's transcript was taken. 
EXHIBITS: 
Claimant filed exhibits 1-5 with Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling. Those exhibits are contained in the Agency's Record with the memorandum. 
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STATE OF IDAHO, 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
****** 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2005-501080 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
A WARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
FI LED 
JUN 2 6 2014 
Industrial Commission 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AW ARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS - I 
COME NOW Claimant, Gary Davis ("Claimant"), Hammack Management, Inc. 
("Employer") and the State Insurance Fund ( "Surety") and the State ofldaho, Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund, ("ISIP"), by and through their respective attorneys, and hereby Stipulate to the 
Entry of Award against Employer, Surety and the ISIP, hereafter collectively referred to as 
"Defendants" in this case. This Stipulation is made upon the following grounds and for the 
following reasons: 
1. On or about November 9, 2004, Claimant was employed by Employer and 
earning approximately $400.00 per week as a maintenance man. On that date Claimant was 
injured as a result of an accident occurring in the course and scope of his employment with 
Employer (the "industrial injury"). 
2. Employer, at the time of the industrial injury, was insured for its worker's 
compensation liability by Surety under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
3. At the time of the industrial injury, Claimant was Thirty-Seven (37) years old and 
married. 
4. Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission 
("Commission") by duly serving Employer with his Complaint. Employer and Surety later 
joined the ISIP. Defendants have duly filed and served their Answers and Affirmative Defenses. 
5. As a result of the industrial injury, Claimant suffered an injury to his low 
back aggravating a pre-existing back condition and causing severe and permanent injuries as 
more fully appears from the matters and papers on file with the Commission. 
6. Claimant contends and Defendants agree that Claimant suffered from and has 
been disabled by certain injuries, diseases, and/or infirmities which pre-existed the industrial 
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injury. ISIP stipulates and agrees that 1) Claimant suffered from permanent pre-existing 
physical impairments relating to his cervical and lumbar spine, including impairments resulting 
from four ( 4) lumbar surgeries prior to the industrial injury; 2) that his permanent pre-existing 
physical impairments were manifest; 3) that his permanent pre-existing physical impairments 
were hindrances and obstacles to employment; 4) that the industrial injury aggravated, 
accelerated, and otherwise combined with his permanent pre-existing conditions; and 5) that 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of his permanent pre-existing conditions 
and his industrial injury and relevant non-medical factors. 
7. Following the industrial injury, Claimant was examined and treated by numerous 
physicians, both treating physicians and independent medical evaluators. Among the more 
significant aspects of his medical course since the industrial injury are the following: 
a. 3/1/05: 1) Bilateral revision laminectomy at 14-5, 2) Foraminotomy at 14-
5 and 15-Sl, 3) Revision diskectomy at 14-5 and 15-Sl bilaterally, 4) 14-
5 and 15-S 1 posterior lumbar interbody fusion, PCR interbody spacer, 
iliac crest autograft, 5) 14-5 and 15-Sl posterolateral fusion with iliac 
crest autograft, 6) Segmental pedicle screw instrumentation at 14-5 and 
15-S 1, 7) Harvesting right iliac crest bone graft, 8) Use of operating 
microscope, 9) Repair of durotomy. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson. 
b. 10/27/05: 1) Bilateral 12-3, 13-4 laminectomy, 2) Exploration of the 
lumbar spine. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson. Post-op complications: 
Infection to left hip. 
c. 8/23/07: 1) Removal of hardware, 14 to Sl, 2) Facet arthrodesis ofL4-5 
and 15-Sl, 3) Re-do lumbar laminectomies, bilateral medial facetectomies 
and foraminotomies, 12-3, 13-4, and 14-5, 4) Posterior lumbar interbody 
fusion 13-4, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation 12, 13, 14, 15 and 
SI, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion 12, 13 and 14, 7) Harvest of 
left-sided iliac crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
d. 9/16/08: 1) Removal of hardware, 14 to Sl, 2) Assessment of arthrodesis 
at 12-3, 13-4, 14-5, and 15-Sl, 3) Lumbar laminectomy with bilateral 
medial facetectomies and fibraminotomies, including diskectomy at Ll-2 
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for bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 4) Re-do left sided 
L3- 4 and L4-5 hemilaminotomy and medial facetectomies for spinal canal and 
neural decompression, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation Tl 0-12, 
Ll-L5, and Sl, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion ofT10-Tl2, LI and 
L3. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
e. 5/18/10: 1) Removal of hardware including Sl screws, 2) Assessment of 
arthrodesis at L5-S1, 3) Re-do L5-S1 bilateral decompression and 
laminotomy, 4) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation, L5-S1, 5) 
Posterolateral intersegmental fusion, L5-S1, 6) Harvest of right-sided iliac 
crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
f. 12/6/10: 1) Anterior cervical microdiskectomy at C4-5, C5-6 and C6-7 for 
bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 2) Anterior cervical 
interbody fusions C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7, 3) Anterior cervical plating, C4-
5, 6 and 7, 4) Harvest of sternal bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
g. 2/14/13: C3 through 7 anterior cervical decompression and stabilization 
and T7 through sacral fusion and instrumentation. Performed by Dr. 
Hajjar. 
8. Claimant's permanent partial impairments resulting from the industrial injury have 
been rated by numerous physicians, both treating physicians and through the IME process. The 
ratings for the industrial injury range from a high of 100% whole person impairment (Drs. 
Fredrickson and Hajjar-both treating physicians) to a low of 22% whole person impairment 
(IME ofDrs. Wilson and Frizzell). The parties stipulate and agree that October 1, 2013 shall be 
designated as the date of medical stability and the date on which Claimant became totally and 
permanently disabled ("MMI date"). 
9. Following the industrial injury, and as a result thereof, Claimant was temporarily 
disabled and has been paid all benefits due for such temporary disability through the MMI date 
and has been paid all compensable medical benefits through the date hereof. 
10. Defendants hereby stipulate that Claimant had 32% aggregate whole person 
permanent partial impairment before the industrial injury and that Claimant suffered an 
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additional 27% whole person permanent partial impairment due to the industrial injury. As 
Defendants stipulate that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, they agree to apportion 
the nonmedical factors and the additional remaining permanent disability according to law. 
Therefore, Employer accepts responsibility for paying 250 weeks of total and permanent 
disability income benefits, commencing as of Claimant's MMI date, October 1, 2013. 
11. Starting October 1, 2013 and continuing for 250 weeks thereafter, unless 
Claimant dies prior to the expiration of such 250-week period, Surety shall be responsible to pay 
Claimant total and permanent disability income benefits in the amount of 55% of the average 
weekly state wage for 2004, the year of the industrial injury, namely, $293.70 per week, subject 
to the credit described in paragraph 12, below. Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is 
entitled to be paid total and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average 
weekly state wage pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409. Therefore, the total and 
permanent disability benefit rate for claimant for 2013 is $303.30 per week, and for 2014 is 
$307.80 per week. The difference between Surety's obligation of $293. 70 per week and 
Claimant's benefit rate of 45% of the prevailing average state weekly wage shall be paid by the 
ISIP. Therefore, for the period of October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, the ISIF will pay 
to Claimant the sum of $9.60 per week. For the calendar year 2014, ISIP shall be obligated to 
pay to Claimant the differential amount of $14.10 per week. At the expiration of said 250 week 
period, subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, below, the ISIP will pay Claimant his full 
statutory income benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly 
wage, until Claimant's death. 
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12. Surety has accepted aggregate permanent physical impairment ratings amounting 
to 27% whole person impairment for the industrial injury and paid the benefits associated with 
such ratings. In addition, Surety has paid Claimant benefits corresponding to 5% whole person 
as an advance against permanent disability. These benefits, combined, amount to a total of 160 
weeks. The amount paid by Surety to Claimant for the 160 weeks based on the combined total 
of the 27% whole person PPI and 5% advance against permanent disability, amounts to $46,992. 
Notwithstanding any other provision herein, Surety is entitled to a credit of 160 weeks, or 
$46,992, against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits to 
Claimant beginning October 1, 2013, leaving a total of 90 weeks of benefits to be paid by Surety. 
13. The Claimant retained Claimant's counsel to represent him in this worker's 
compensation claim on or about 12/29/04. A Complaint was filed with the Industrial 
Commission on or about 4/27 /06. The parties stipulate and agree that the efforts of Claimant's 
counsel have operated primarily and substantially to secure all of the worker's compensation 
benefits that the Claimant has received in this worker's compensation claim since the date when 
Claimant's counsel was retained on 12/29/04. Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e), 
Claimant's counsel shall be allowed to assert a charging lien of 25% against the Claimant's 
worker's compensation benefits that are being paid pursuant to the terms of this stipulation. 
However, after a period of 10 years from the date when the Claimant achieved MMI on 10/1/13 
(I.e., on 10.1.23), the Claimant's attorney's charging lien shall be reduced from 25% down to 
15% in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e)(iii). 
14. All parties stipulate and agree that the Commission shall, on and by approval 
hereof, be deemed to have fully adjudicated said accident as against Defendants, resultant 
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injuries industrial in nature and origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the 
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. 
15. The above outlined payments, agreed to be paid by Defendants, are in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims Claimant has, and may now or hereafter 
make against Defendants and any of them for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws 
of the State of Idaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services 
related to the industrial accident. Approval of this Stipulation to Entry of Award by the 
Commission shall fully and finally discharge Defendants from liability for any and all claims 
Claimant has, and may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of 
whatever nature or kind for total and permanent disability compensation and all other claims 
Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws of 
the State of Idaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services. This 
is the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or 
claims is now known or foreseen, and regardless of whether Claimant shall ever again injure 
himself in another or future accident, or otherwise, or suffer any disease which would arguably 
cause the Defendants, or any of them, to be liable for additional claims or benefits under the laws 
of the State of Idaho. This Stipulation shall, upon approval and entry of award by the Industrial 
Commission, discharge the Defendants, and each of them, from liability for this and any other 
and all claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the 
subject of this action or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or infirmities 
existing prior to such accident or hereafter arising. 
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16. Upon Order of the Commission approving this Stipulation, and excepting only 
payment of said sums by Defendants as aforesaid, Defendants and each of them shall be, and by 
these presents are fully, finally and forever discharged and released of and from any and all 
additional liability to Claimant on account of the above alleged accident, save and except for 
Surety's responsibility for compensable medical benefits and medical services related to the 
industrial accident, pursuant to law. 
17. Surety stipulates that it will continue to provide medical benefits and services to 
Claimant for his industrial injuries, infirmities and conditions causally related to his industrial 
llljury. 
18. The terms of this Stipulation shall be binding upon all of the undersigned parties, 
their heirs, representatives, successors and assigns. 
19. All parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be 
deemed to adjudicate said alleged accident, resultant injury and disability industrial in nature and 
origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the Worker's Compensation Laws of the 
State of Idaho. 
20. The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for 
and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if 
this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care 
causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for total 
and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law. 
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DATED this ~day of J\llli\).,, , 2014. 
CLAIMANT: 
JJ~~ 
-?ciARYDAVIS (  
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
County of Au\~ :ss. ) 
On this~ day of r , 2014, before me a Notary Public in and for said 
State, personally appeared G YDA VIS, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed in the above and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in the 
certificate first above written. 
My Comm. Expires: _µ..............,V\,Ui~~--~Cj ,-' c1]~Ll ...... q __ 
lliclkfr~~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
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' . 
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
, Assis t Manager/Claims 
Authorized Representative of Employer and S 
As to form only: 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
Be~ 
r..... . . 
Kenneth L. Mallea, Attorney for ISIF 
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
The foregoing Stipulation for Entry of A ward Against Defendants ("Stipulation") having 
duly and regularly come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and 
the best interests of the parties are and will be served by approving said Stipulation and granting 
the Order of Discharge as prayed for: 
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing Stipulation for Entry of Award Against 
Defendants shall be, and the same hereby is APPROVED, and the Complaint in this matter is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this r;)..p day of_'1~V_N_f ___ , 2014. 
INDUSTRJAL COMMISSION 
By 
Chairman 
!~01 011 
Member 7 
ATTEST: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J.1L day of J VN( , 2014, a true and 
correct copy of STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AW ARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL was served by United States Mail upon each of the following: 
Rick D. Kallas 
1031 East Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Attorney for Claimant 
JonMBauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Employer/Surety 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
P OBox 857 
Meridian, ID 83680-0857 
. Attorney for Defendant ISIF 
Verlene Wise/James F. Kile 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-7901 
Defendant ISIF 
4842-2787-2282, v. I 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
E-mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
Attorney for Claimant 
0
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RECEIVED 
STRIAL COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
Davis/ Claimant's 2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
LC. No. 2005 - 501080 
CLAIMANT'S PETITION FOR 
DECLARATORY RULING WHICH 
INTERPRETS AND CLARIFIES THE 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
A WARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND 
DISCHARGE ENTERED BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON 6.26.14 
13 
COMES NOW Claimant, Gary Davis, and pursuant to J.R.P. 15, hereby requests that the 
Industrial Commission enter a Declaratory Ruling which interprets the rights, duties and 
obligations of the parties pursuant to the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants and 
the Order of Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial Commission on 6.26.14. 
(A) Issues in Dispute. 
The following issues are in dispute and require a Declaratory Ruling: 
1. Whether the $39,649.50 invalid PPI credit granted to Employer for the 27% whole person 
PPI award previously paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that Claimant was 
totally and permanently disabled is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 and the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 
(2014) because it deprives the Claimant of the full measure of his statutory total and 
permanent disability (TPD) benefits and does not "conform to the provisions of this 
law"? 
2. Whether the $39,649.50 invalid credit taken by Employer for the 27% whole person PPI 
award previously paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that Claimant was totally 
and permanently disabled is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(1) and the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 
(2014) because it unfairly relieves Employer in whole or in part from its liability to pay 
the Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits pursuant to the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Act? 
3. Whether the $39,649.50 invalid credit taken by Employer for the 27% whole person PPI 
award previously paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that Claimant was totally 
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and permanently disabled is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(2) and the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 
(2014) because it unfairly requires the Claimant to waive his right to receive the full 
measure of his statutory TPD benefits under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act? 
4. Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must begin paying the Claimant his full . 
statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable average weekly state 90 
weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13 pursuant to the unambiguous terms of 
the Stipulation which made ISIP liability "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 
12"? 
5. Whether the Stipulation is ambiguous when defining the date when the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund's obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits would begin and whether 
that ambiguity should be construed against the ISIP and in favor of the Claimant since the 
ISIP drafted the language of the Stipulation? 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees from Employer and ISIP 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 because Employer and ISIP have both contested the 
Claimant's claim for the full measure of his TPD benefits that he is entitled to receive 
pursuant to the Act and the Stipulation without reasonable grounds? 
(B) An Actual Controversy Exists With Both Defendants 
1. The Claimant wrote to Employer on 1.15 .15 and asked Employer to either reimburse the 
Claimant for the $39,649.50 invalid PPI credit that it took against the Claimant's TPD 
benefits or stipulate to amend the 6.26.14 Stipulation in order to eliminate the credit. 
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Employer denied both requests on 1.20 .15. Therefore, an actual controversy exists with 
Employer over the validity of its taking the illegal credit for PPI benefits previously paid. 
2. The Claimant wrote to ISIP on 2.2.15 and asked ISIP to confirm in writing that it would 
begin paying Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently 
applicable A WSW beginning 90 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13 in 
accordance with the express language of the Stipulation. The ISIF responded to the 
Claimant's 2.2.15 letter on 2.5 .15 and denied the Claimant's requests. Therefore, an 
actual controversy exists with ISIF over the date when its obligation to pay the Claimant 
his full statutory total and permanent disability benefits begins. 
(C) The Claimant's Interest in Receiving Full Statutory TPD Benefits is at Stake 
The Claimant has an interest in collecting his full statutory TPD benefits based on the 
statutory rate of 45% of the currently applicable average weekly state wage from the stipulated 
date of MMI on 10 .1.13 until the date he dies based on the stated purpose of the Stipulation and 
the provisions of the Act. 
If Employer stops paying its 55% share of the Claimant's TPD disability benefits after 90 
weeks based on its invalid PPI credit and the ISIF refuses to begin paying the Claimant his full 
statutory benefits until after 250 weeks from the stipulated date ofMMI on 10.1.13, the Claimant 
will go 160 weeks or more than 3 years without collecting his full statutory TPD benefits in 
direct violation of the stated purpose of the stipulation and the substantive provisions of Idaho's 
workers' compensation Act. 
This Petition For Declaratory Ruling is based on the express terms of the Stipulation and 
Order entered on 6.26.14, the facts and legal authorities cited in the Claimant's Memorandum In 
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Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling (including Exhibits No. 1-5), the sworn statements of 
Claimant in his Affidavit In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling (Ex. 5) and the 
provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. A copy of the 6.26.14 Stipulation and 
Order and Approval of Discharge is attached to this Petiition. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February 2015. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By: ~1),~ 
RlCKD~LAS~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the method indicated below 
upon the following persons: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam&Burke 
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Davis/ Claimant's 2.26.15 Petition For Declaratoiy Ruling 
[ X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 208.384.5844 
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Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
ISB No. 2397 
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AITORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STATE OF IDAHO, 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
****** 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2005-501080 
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COME NOW Claimant, Gary Davis ("Claimant"), Hammack Management, Inc. 
("Employer,,) and the State Insurance Fund ( "Surety,,) and the State of Idaho, Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund, ("ISIF"), by and through their respective attorneys, and hereby Stipulate to the 
Entry of Award against Employer, Surety and the ISIP, hereafter collectively referred to as 
''Defendants" in this case. This Stipulation is made upon the following grounds and for the 
following reasons: 
I. On or about November 9, 2004, Claimant was employed by Employer and 
earning approximately $400.00 per week as a maintenance man. On that date Claimant was 
injured as a result of an accident occurring in the course and scope of his employment with 
Employer (the "industrial injury,,). 
2. Employer, at the time of the industrial iajury, was insured for its worker's 
compensation liability by Surety under the laws of the State ofldaho. 
3. At the time of the industrial injury, Claimant was Thirty-Seven (37) years old and 
married. 
4. Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission 
("Commission") by duly serving Employer with his Complaint. Employer and Surety later 
joined the ISIF. Defendants have duly filed and served their Answers and Affirmative Defenses. 
5. As a result of the industrial injury, Claimant suffered an injury to his low 
back aggravating a pre-existing back condition and causing severe and permanent injuries as 
more fully appears from the matters and papers on file with the Commission. 
6. Claimant contends and Defendants agree that Claimant suffered from and has 
been disabled by certain injuries, diseases, and/or infinnities which pre-existed the industrial · 
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injury. ISIF stipulates and agrees that 1) Claimant suffered from permanent pre-existing 
physical impainnents relating to his cervica] and lumbar spine, including impainnents resulting 
from four ( 4) lumbar surgeries prior to the industrial injury; 2) that his permanent pre-existing 
physical impairments were manifest; 3) that his permanent pre-existing physical impairments 
were hindrances and obstacles to employment; 4) that the industrial injury aggravated, 
accelerated, and otherwise combined with his permanent pre-existing conditions; and 5) that 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of his permanent pre-existing conditions 
and his industrial injury and relevant non-medical factors. 
7. Following the industrial injury, Claimant was examined and treated by numerous 
physicians, both treating physicians and independent medical evaluators. Among the more 
significant aspects of his medical course since the industrial injury are the following: 
a. 3/1/05: 1) Bilateral revision laminectomy at L4-5, 2) Foraminotomy at L4-
5 and L5-S1, 3) Revision diskectomy at L4-5 and L5-S1 bilaterally, 4) L4-
5 and LS-SI posterior lumbar interbody fusion, PCR interbody spacer, 
iliac crest autograft, 5) L4-5 and LS-SI posterolateral fusion with iliac 
crest autograft, 6) Segmental pedicle screw instrumentation at L4-5 and 
L5-S I, 7) Harvesting right iliac crest bone graft, 8) Use of operating 
microscope, 9) Repair of durotomy. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson. 
b. 10/27/05: I) Bilateral L2-3, L3-4 laminectomy, 2) Exploration of the 
lumbar spine. Performed by Dr. Jorgenson. Post-op complications: 
Infection to left hip. 
c. 8/23/07: I) Removal of hardware, 14 to S 1, 2) Facet arthrodesis of L4-5 
and LS-SI, 3) Re-do lumbar laminectomies, bilateral medial facetectomies 
and foraminotomies, L2-3, L3-4, and L4-5, 4) Posterior lumbar interbody 
fusion L3-4, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation L2, L3, L4, LS and 
S 1, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion 12, L3 and L4, 7) Harvest of 
left-sided iliac crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
d. 9/16/08: 1) Removal of hardware, 14 to Sl, 2) Assessment of arthrodesis 
at L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, and LS-SI, 3) Lumbar Iaminectomy with bilateral 
medial facetectomies and fibraminotomies, including diskectomy at LI-2 
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for bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 4) Re-do left sided 
L3- 4 and L4-5 hemilaminotomy and medial facetectomies for spinal canal and 
neural decompression, 5) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation TI0-12, 
Ll-L5, and Sl, 6) Posterolateral intersegmental fusion ofTIO-Tl2, L1 and 
L3. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
e. 5/18/10: 1) Removal of hardware including SI screws, 2) Assessment of 
arthrodesis at L5-S1, 3) Re-do LS-SI bilateral decompression and 
laminotomy, 4) Posterolateral intersegmental fixation, LS-Sl, 5) 
Posterolateral intersegmental fusion, LS-SI, 6) Harvest ofright-sided iliac 
crest bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
f. 12/6/10: I) Anterior cervical microdiskectomy at C4-5, CS-6 and C6-7 for 
bilateral spinal canal and neural decompression, 2) Anterior cervical 
interbody fusions C4-5, CS-6, and C6-7, 3) Anterior cervical plating, C4-
5, 6 and 7, 4) Harvest of sternal bone graft. Performed by Dr. Hajjar. 
g. 2/14/13: C3 through 7 anterior cervical decompression and stabilization 
and T7 through sacral fusion and instrumentation. Performed by Dr. 
Hajjar. 
8. Claimant's permanent partial impairments resulting from the industrial injury have 
been rated by numerous physicians, both treating physicians and through the IME process. The 
ratings for the industrial injmy range from a high of I 00% whole person impairment (Drs. 
Fredrickson and Hajjar-both treating physicians) to a low of22% whole person impainnent 
j 
(IME ofDrs. Wilson and Frizzell). The parties stipulate and agree that October 1, 2013 shall be 
designated as the date of medical stability and the date on which Claimant became totally and 
pennanently disabled ("MMI date"). 
9. Following the industrial injury, and as a result thereof, Claimant was temporarily 
disabled and has been paid all benefits due for such temporary disability through the MMI date 
and has been paid all compensable medical benefits through the date hereof. 
. 10. Defendants hereby stipulate that Claimant had 32% aggregate whole person 
pennanent partial impairment before the industrial injury and that Claimant suffered an 
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additional 27% whole person pennanent partial impainnent due to the industrial irtjury. As 
Defendants stipulate that Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled, they agree to apportion 
the nonmedical factors and the additional remaining pennanent disability according to law. 
Therefore, Employer accepts responsibility for paying 250 weeks of total and permanent 
disability income benefits, commencing as of Claimant's MMI date, October I, 2013. 
11. Starting October l, 2013 and continuing for250 weeks thereafter, unless 
Claimant dies prior to the expiration of such 250-week period, Surety shall be responsible to pay 
Claimant total and permanent disability income benefits in the amount of 55% of the average 
weekly state wage for 2004, the year of the industrial injury, namely, $293.70 per week, subject 
to the credit described in paragraph 12, below. Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is 
entitled to be paid total and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average 
weekly state wage pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409. Therefore, the total and 
pennanent disability benefit rate for claimant for2013 is $303.30 per week, and for 2014 is 
-$307.80 per week. The difference between Surety's obligation of $293,70 per week and 
Claimant's benefit rate of 45% of the prevailing average state weekly~age shall be paid by the 
ISIF. Therefore, for the period of October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, the ISIF will pay 
to Claimant the sum of $9.60 per week. For the calendar year 2014, ISIF shall be obligated to 
pay to Claimant the differential amount of$14.10 per week. At the expiration of said 250 week 
period, subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, below, the ISIF will pay Claimant his full 
statutory income benefits, said amowit being 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly 
wage, until Claimant's death. 
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12. Surety has accepted aggregate permanent physical impairment ratings amounting 
to 27% whole person impairment for the industrial injury and paid the benefits associated with 
such ratings. In addition, Surety has paid Claimant benefits corresponding to 5% whole person 
as an advance against permanent disability. These benefits, combined, amount to a total of 160 
weeks. The amount paid by Surety to Claimant for the 160 weeks based on the combined total 
of the 27% whole person PPI and 5% advance against permanent disability, amounts to $46,99......_ ____ _ 
Notwithstanding any other provision herein, Surety is entitled to a credit of I 60 weeks, or 
$46,992, against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits to 
Claimant beginning October l, 2013, leaving a total of90 weeks of benefits to be paid by Surety. 
13. The Claimant retained Claimant's counsel to represent him in this worker's 
compensation claim on or about 12/29/04. A Complaint was filed with the Industrial 
Commission on or about 4/27/06. The parties stipulate and agree that the efforts of Claimant's 
counsel have operated primarily and substantially to secure all of the worker's compensation 
benefits that the Claimant has received in this worker's compensation claim since the date when 
Claimant's counsel was retained on 12/29/04. Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e), 
Claimant's counsel shall be allowed to assert a charging lien of25% against the Claimant's 
workers compensation benefits that are being paid pursuant to the terms of this stipulation. 
However, after a period of 10 years from the date when the Claimant achieved MMI on I 0/1/13 
(I.e., on I 0.1.23), the Claimant's attorney's charging lien shall be reduced from 25% down to 
15% in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0I(e)(iii). 
14. All parties stipulate and agree that the Commission shall, on and by approval 
hereof, be deemed to have fully adjudicated said accident as against Defendants, resultant 
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injuries industrial in nature and origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the 
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State ofldaho. 
15. The above outlined payments, agreed to be paid by Defendants, are in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims Claimant has, and may now or hereafter 
make against Defendants and any of them for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws 
of the State ofidaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services 
related to the industrial accident. Approval of this Stipulation to Entry of Award by the 
Commission shall fully and finally discharge Defendants from liability for any and all claims 
Claimant has, and may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of 
whatever nature or kind for total and permanent disability compensation and all other claims 
Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Laws of 
the State ofldaho, save and except for compensable medical benefits and medical services. This 
is the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or 
claims is now known or foreseen, and regardless of whether Claimant shall ever again injure 
himself in another or future accident, or otherwise, or suffer any disease which would arguably 
cause the Defendants, or any of them, to be liable for additional claims or benefits under the laws 
of the State ofldaho. This Stipulation shall, upon approval and entry of award by the Industrial 
Commission, discharge the Defendants, and each of them, from liability for this and any other 
and all claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the 
subject of this action or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impainnents, disabilities or in:finnities 
existing prior to such accident or hereafter arising. 
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payment of said sums by Defendants as aforesaid, Defendants and each of them shall be, and by 
these presents are fully, finally and forever discharged and released of and from any and all 
additional liability to Claimant on account of the above alleged accident, save and except for 
Surety's responsibility for compensable medical benefits and medical services related to the 
industrial accident, pursuant to law. 
17. Surety stipulates that it will continue to provide medical benefits and services to 
Claimant for Ws industrial injuries, infirmities and conditions causally related to his industrial 
injury. 
18. The terms of this Stipulation shall be binding upon all of the undersigned parties, 
their heirs, representatives, successors and assigns. 
19. AU parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be 
/, ~\ 
\.' 
deemed to adjudicate said aJleged accident, resultant injury and disahility industrial in nature and 
origin, and all pre-existing disability, as provided by the Worker's Compensation Laws of the 
State ofldaho. 
20. The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for 
and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if 
this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care 
causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for total 
and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to Jaw. 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF A WARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS - 8 
25 
DATED this i,t'day of J!A\U., , 2014. 
CLAIMANT: 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
A.J :ss. 
County of ..... q!l\-t--"-'~"--- ) 
On this ~day o~ , 2014, before me a Notary Public in and for said 
State, personally appeared YDA VIS, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed in the above and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in the 
certificate first above written. 
My Comm. Expires: fl n,\~ 5 I oblg 
ru.&&o®J 
Attorney for Claimant 
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~E~ 
By: ~ager/Claims 
Authorized Representative of Employer and S 
As to form only: 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
Kenneth L. Mallea, Attorney for ISIF 
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
The foregoing Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants ("Stipulation") having 
duly and regularly come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and 
the best interests of the parties are and will be served by approving said Stipulation and granting 
the Order of Discharge as prayed for: 
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing Stipulation for Entry of Award Against 
Defendants shall be, and the same hereby is APPROVED, and the Complaint in this matter is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this JJf!_ day of.....;J.._V...;_~ ...... f___ _., 2014. 
ATTEST: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
By 
.. 
" g
.. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the jJ,j__ day of JVN( . 2014, a true and 
correct copy of STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF AW ARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL was served by United States Mail upon each of the following: 
Rick D. Kallas 
I 031 East Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Attorney far Claimant 
JonMBauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Employer/Surety 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
P0Box857 
Meridian, ID 83680-0857 
Attorney for Defendant ISIF 
Verlene Wise/James F. Kile 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
PO Box83720 
Boise, ID 83720-7901 
Defendant ISJF 
4842-2787-2282, v. I 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
E-mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
Attorney for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND, 
. Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
Davis/ Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
I.C. No. 2005 - 501080 
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Gary Davis, the Claimant, being first duly sworn on oath, states as follows: 
1. I am the Claimant in this case and make this affidavit based on my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. Before I signed the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against the Defendants in my case on 
June 6, 2014, I sat down in my attorney's office and read the Stipulation. At that time, it 
was my understanding that the State Insurance Fund had agreed to pay its share of my 
total and permanent disability benefits for 250 weeks after the date when the parties 
stipulated that I reached maximum medical improvement on October 1, 2013. However, 
based on the language of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation, I understood that the 
State Insurance Fund was taking a credit against its obligation to pay 250 weeks worth of 
TPD benefits based on the 27% PPI award that it had paid to me and the 5% disability 
above impairment award it had paid to me before the parties stipulated that I was totally 
and permanently disabled by my industrial injury. 
3. After the State Insurance Fund took the credits described in paragraph 12 of the 
Stipulation, I knew that it would stop paying me its share of my TPD benefits 90 weeks 
after October 1, 2013. However, I was not concerned about losing those payments from 
the State Insurance Fund because it was my understanding that the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full statutory total and permanent disability 
benefits based on 45% of the current Average Weekly State Wage when the State 
Insurance Fund stopped making its payments. It did not matter to me who paid my 
benefits as long as I continued to receive the full measure of my benefits based on 45% of 
the current Average Weekly State Wage. 
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4. My understanding that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full 
statutory total and permanent disability benefits based on 45% of the current Average 
Weel<ly State Wage after 90 weeks was based on the plain language of paragraph 11 
which said that the State Insurance Fund's obligation to pay me was "subject to the 
credit" in paragraph 12 and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund's obligation was also 
"subject to the credit" in paragraph 12. In my mind, that meant that when the State 
Insurance Fund's obligation stopped after 90 weeks, the Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund's obligation to pay full benefits would start. 
5. IfI would have known that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would take the position 
that it did not have to start paying me my full statutory total and permanent disability 
benefits until after 250 weeks, I never would have signed the Stipulation since it would 
require me to waive my right to receive the full measure of my statutory total and 
permanent disability benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250. 
6. I cannot live and pay my bills based on the small differential payment that I will receive 
from the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund based on the difference between 45% of the 
current Average Weel<ly State Wage and 55% of the Average Weekly State Wage for the 
year that I was injured back in 2004. 
7. Based on 45% of the Average Weekly State Wage in 2015, that differential payment is 
only $16.35 per week or $65.40 per month. After paying my attorney 25%, I will only 
receive $49.05 per month. 
8. I cannot live and pay my bills on $49.05 per month. Therefore, I am asking the Industrial 
Commission to not allow the State Insurance Fund to take the invalid credit for the 27% 
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whole person PPI award that it previously paid to me. I understand that the State 
Insurance Fund is legally entitled to take a credit for the 5% disability above impairment 
benefits that it paid to me on a voluntary basis and I do not have any objection to that 
credit. 
9. If the Industrial Commission is going to allow the State Insurance Fund to take the 27% 
PPI credit, then I would ask the Industrial Commission to require the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund to begin paying full statutory benefits based on 45% of the current 
Average Weekly State Wage when the State Insurance Fund payments stop after 90 
weeks from October 1, 2013. 
10. If the State Insurance Fund is allowed to stop making payments after 90 weeks from 
10.1.13 but the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund does not have to start paying my full 
statutory benefits until 250 weeks after 10.1.13, I will not be able to survive on the small 
differential payment from the ISIP for more than 3 years. 
Further your Affiant Sayeth Naught. 
Dated this 25th day of February, 2015. 
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~ I' ' ,f 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this 25th day of February, 2015 
County of Ada ) 
: S.S. 
State of Idaho ) 
NotPublic For Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: lt\Qt!M\yY loJ o'Olt?/ 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Claimant's Affidavit In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the 
method indicated below upon the following persons: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam& Burke 
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
[ X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 208.384.5844 
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(A) BACKGROUND FACTS 
The Claimant and the Defendants entered into a Stipulation For Entry of A ward 
Against Defendants that the Industrial Commission entered as an Order of Approval and 
Discharge on 6.26.14. The stated purpose of the Stipulation was to provide the Claimant 
with "the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if this matter 
proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care 
causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for 
total and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" (See if20 on page 8 of 
the Stipulation). 
Based on application of the formula announced in Carey v. Clearwater County 
Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), Employer agreed to pay Claimant 
250 weeks of benefits at 55% of the average weekly state wage for the year that Claimant 
was injured in 2004 starting on 10.1.13 (See ,r 10 of the Stipulation). However, 
Employer's obligation to pay Claimant 250 weeks of benefits was "subject to the credit 
described in paragraph 12, below" which shortened Employer's liability for total and 
permanent disability (TPD) benefits from 250 weeks down to 90 weeks (See ifl 1 of the 
Stipulation). 
Paragraph 12 gave Employer 2 credits: (1) an invalid credit of 135 weeks for the 
27% whole person PPI award that Employer paid to Claimant prior to the date when the 
parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled (i.e., 27% X 500 
weeks= 135 weeks X 55% of 2004 AWSW of $293.70 = $39,649.50); and (2) a valid 
credit of 25 weeks based on the 5% disability in excess of impairment benefits that 
Employer paid to Claimant on a voluntary basis pursuant to an 11.6.12 Stipulation 
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Regarding Advance of Benefits (i.e., 5% X 500 weeks = 25 weeks X 2004 A WSW of 
$293.70 = $7,342.50) 1• The total combined credit claimed by Employer in paragraph 12 
is $39,649.50 + $7,342.50 = $46,992.00. 
A mere 60 days after the Industrial Commission entered its Order of Approval 
and Discharge in this case on 6.26.14, the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) on 8.25.14. The 
Corgatelli Court held that there is no statutory basis under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act to give Employer credit for PPI benefits paid prior to a determination 
that the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. 
Based on the holding in Corgatelli and the provisions of the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act, the Claimant wrote to Employer on 1.22.15 and asked Employer to 
either reimburse him for the invalid credit that it took against his TPD benefits for the PPI 
benefits previously paid or stipulate to amend the 6.26.14 Stipulation to eliminate the 
invalid credit (See Ex. 1). Employer responded on 1.20.15 and rejected both requests 
(See Ex. 2). 
After Employer made it clear that it would stop paying Claimant' its share of his 
TPD benefits at the expiration of 90 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13, 
the Claimant wrote to ISIP on 2.2.15 and asked the ISIP to confirm in writing that it 
would begin paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits at 45% of the currently 
applicable A WSW after the expiration of 90 weeks from the stipulated date of MMI on 
10.1.13 (See Ex. 3). 
1 The Claimant concedes that Employer is entitled to claim the 25-week credit of $7,342.50 for the disability in excess 
of impairment payments that Employer made on a voluntary basis pursuant to the 11.6.12 Stipulation. 
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Even though the ISIF's obligation to pay Claimant the full measure of his 
statutory TPD benefits was "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, below" 
which shortened the ISIP payment obligation from 250 weeks to 90 weeks (See if 11 of 
the Stipulation), the ISIP responded to the Claimant's 2.2.15 request on 2.5.15 and 
refused to confirm that it would begin paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefit 
of 45% of the currently applicable A WSW at the expiration of 90 weeks after the 
stipulated date ofMMI on 10.1.13 (See Ex. 4). 
Based on the Employer's unconscionable position that is entitled to claim a 
invalid credit in violation of the Claimant's substantive rights under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act and the ISIP's unconscionable position that its obligation to pay 
Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits is not "subject to" the credit even 
though the Stipulation clearly indicates otherwise, the Claimant has been placed in the 
unjustified position of being deprived of the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits 
for more than 3 years or 160 weeks from week 90 to week 250. 
The Claimant cannot afford to purchase the basic necessities of life for more than 
3 years between week 90 and week 250 based on the small differential payment that he 
will receive from the ISIP based on the difference between 55% of the A WSW in 2004 of 
$293.70 and 45% of the currently applicable A WSW (See Ex. 5). In 2015, the small 
differential payment made by ISIP is $16.35 per week calculated as follows: 45% of 
2015 A WSW= $310.05 - 55% of 2004 AWSW of $293.70 = $16.35 per week X 4 = 
$65.40 per month. After paying a 25% attorney's fee, the Claimant will only receive 
$49.05 per month. The Claimant cannot survive on $49.05 per month (See Ex. 5). 
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(B) ARGUMENT 
1. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISION SHOULD DECLARE THE INVALID PPI 
CREDIT CLAIMED BY EMPLOYER VOID UNDER THE ACT 
The Stipulation approved by the Commission on 6.26.14 gives Employer a credit 
for the 27% whole person PPI award that Employer paid to Claimant prior to the date 
when the parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled. 
However, in Cogatelli, the Court held that there was no statutory basis for the 
Commission to give Employer a credit for PPI benefits previously paid in a total and 
permanent disability case: 
Examining worker's compensation law as a whole, Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 
141 Idaho 524, 528, 112 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), this Court finds that there 
is no statutory basis for the Commission to award Steel West a credit for 
permanent physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli .... 
Thus, the current version of Idaho Code section 72-408, which provides 
for the employee such as Corgatelli to receive total and permanent 
disability benefits, includes no deduction or credit for previously paid 
permanent impairment benefits in its award of disability benefits. . .. 
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the 
employer to receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits 
paid before the award of total and permanent disability benefits. As a 
purely statutory scheme, the Court cannot judicially construct a credit for 
employers into worker's compensation law. Corgatelli, 335 P.3d 1155. 
Even before the Corgatelli decision was published on 8.25.14, there was no 
statutory basis for the Commission to award Employer a $39,649.50 PPI credit against its 
obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits. Therefore, 
the Commission acted beyond the authority or jurisdiction granted to it by statute when it 
awarded Employer the invalid PPI credit in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-711 and 
Idaho Code §72-318. Neither the Commission nor the Supreme Court is authorized to 
judicially construct a credit that does not exist under the provisions of the Act. 
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The Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants approved the 
Commission on 6.26.14 was basically a Compensation Agreement which is authorized by 
Idaho Code §72-711 - Compensation agreements. However, that statute expressly 
provides that the Commission does not have authority to approve an agreement which 
does not conform to the provisions of the worker's compensation act: 
72-711. Compensation agreements. If the employer and the afflicted 
employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a 
memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the commission, and, if 
approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be an 
award by the commission and be enforceable under the provisions of 
section 72-735, unless modified as provided in section 72-719. An 
agreement shall be approved by the commission only when the terms 
conform to the provisions of this law. 
Even before the Supreme Court entered its holding in Cortagelli on 8.25.14, the 
PPI credit approved by the Commission in this case on 6.26.14 was invalid because it did 
not "conform to the provisions of this law". Therefore, the Commission did not have the 
authority or jurisdiction to approve those provisions of the Stipulation which granted 
Employer the invalid credit. 
The Commission should rectify the injustice created by giving Employer the 
invalid credit by entering a declaratory ruling that the PPI credit claimed by Employer is 
void and require Employer to pay 55% of the average weekly state wage of 2004 or 
$293.70 for a period of 225 weeks beginning on the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13 
(i.e., 250 weeks - 25 week credit for the PPD in excess of PPI benefits that Employer 
paid on a voluntary basis pursuant to the 11.6.12 Stipulation= 225 weeks of TPD liability 
for Employer). 
If the Commission does not declare the credit void and allows Employer to claim 
the invalid credit, it will be relieving Employer of its obligation to pay Claimant the full 
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measure of his TPD benefits and it will be requiring the Claimant to waive his right to 
receive the full measure of his TPD benefits in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-318 -
Invalid Agreements - Penalty which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) No agreement ... or any contract, rule regulation or device whatever 
designed to relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability 
created by this law, shall be valid. 
(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation 
under this act shall be valid. 
Since there was no statutory basis to support the Commission giving Employer a 
$39,649.50 invalid credit for PPI benefits previously paid, the credit described in 
paragraphs 11-12 of the stipulation must be declared void because it "relieves the 
employer in whole or part from any liability created by this law" (See LC. §72-318(1)) 
and it requires the "employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act" (See 
§72-318(2)). 
When reviewing the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, the Commission should 
give the Act a liberal reading in favor of providing the injured worker with the full 
measure of the compensation that the Act promises to him: 
When interpreting the Act, we must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the 
employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated. Reese v. V-
J Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005); Davaz v. Priest River Glass 
Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). The Act is designed to provide 
sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families and dependents. Davaz, 125 
Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296; LC. § 72-201. The primary objective of an award of 
permanent disability benefits is to compensate the claimant for his or her loss of earning 
capacity. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296. The purposes served by the Act 
leave no room for narrow technical constructions. Reese, 141 Idaho at 633, 115 P.3d at 
724. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 
1008, 1113 (2009). 
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The Wernecke Court emphasized the important public policy of making sure that 
the injured worker receives the full measure of the benefits that he is entitled to receive 
under the Act: 
Claimants and ISIF do not have absolute freedom to contract because the 
duties of the parties arise under the Act. As one worker's compensation 
expert states in his treatise: 
it must be stressed that the objective of the legislation is not to see how 
much money can be transferred to workers as a class; it is to ensure that 
those with truly compensable claims get full compensation. If there is 
doubt about the compensability of the claim, the solution is not to send the 
claimant away half-compensated, but to let the Compensation Board 
decide the issue. That is the Board's job. 
8 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
LAW§ 132.04[2] (2008) Id. 147 Idaho 285,207 P.3d 1016. 
Because there was no statutory basis for the Commission approve the invalid PPI 
credit and allowing the credit to remain in effect would relieve Employer of its obligation 
to pay full compensation under the Act and would require the Claimant to waive the full 
measure of the TPD benefits that he is entitled to under the Act and the Stipulation, the 
Commission should declare the PPI credit provisions in paragraph 11 and 12 void under 
Idaho Code §72-318 and order Employer to pay the Claimant 55% of the A WSW for 
2004 for 225 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13. 
(2) THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHRASE "SUBJECT TO THE CREDIT" SHOULD BE 
GIVEN ITS PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING TO DEFINE THE DATE 
WHEN EMPLOYER'S PAYMENT OBLIGATION ENDS AND THE DATE 
WHEN THE ISIF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FULL STATUTORY BENEFITS 
BEGINS 
If the Commission does not declare the invalid PPI credit given to Employer in 
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation void and require the Employer to pay the full 
measure of its share of the Claimant's TPD benefits for 225 weeks after the stipulated 
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date of MMI on 10.1.13, the Commission should give the plain and ordinary meaning to 
the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12" and enter a declaratory ruling 
which requires the ISIF to begin paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits 
based on 45% of the currently applicable A WSW 90 weeks after the date of MMI on 
10.1.13 because the ISIP expressly stated in the Stipulation that its obligation to pay full 
statutory TPD benefits was "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12". 
The ISIF's obligation to pay the Claimant full statutory TPD benefits based on 
45% of the then currently applicable A WSW is set forth in paragraph 11 of the 
Stipulation: 
At the expiration of said 250 week period, subject to the credit discussed 
in paragraph 12, below, the ISIP will pay Claimant his full statutory 
income benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average 
state weekly wage, until Claimant's death (italics supplied). 
The phrase "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12" means that the ISIF's 
obligation to begin making full statutory TPD benefits would begin after 90 weeks 
because the ISIP expressly stated that its obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits at 
45% of the A WSW was "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" the credit 
granted to Employer in paragraph 12. 
There is no Idaho Supreme Court decision directly on point which defines the 
meaning of the phrase "subject to". However, that common phrase is used throughout the 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Act as being synonymous with "controlled by" or 
"governed by". For example, in Idaho Code §72-303, the qualifications of a Surety are 
"subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" regulations that have been promulgated 
by the Director of the Department of Insurance. In Idaho Code §72-603, the Employers 
duty to keep and maintain accurate employee records is "subject to" or "controlled by" or 
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"governed by" the provisions of the Act. In Idaho Code §72-719(2), the Commission's 
authority to modify a prior award is "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" the 
maximum and minimum amounts authorized by the Act. 
The common phrase "subject to" is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as follows: 
Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or 
affected by; provided that; provided; answerable for. Homan v. Employers 
Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo, 650, 136 W.W. 2d 289, 302. Black's Law 
Dictionary, 5th Edition, West Publishing Co., 1979. 
This interpretation of the phrase "subject to", which treats it as synonymous with 
the phrases "controlled by" or "governed by", is consistent with the interpretation given 
to the phrase "subject to" by other courts: 
The phrase "subject to" is not synonymous with "according to" or 
"consistent with"; it means conditioned upon, limited by, or subordinate 
to. (Coffey v. Superior Court (1905) 147 Cal. 525, 535 [82 P. 75]; 
National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Frankel (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 830, 
835 [250 Cal.Rptr. 236]; Shay v. Roth (1923) 64 Cal.App. 314, 318 [221 
P. 967]; Colonial Savings & L. Assn. v. Redwood Empire Title Co. (1965) 
236 Cal.App.2d 186, 191-192 [46 Cal.Rptr. 16]; State v. Willburn (1967) 
49 Hawaii 651 [426 P.2d 626, 630].) Thus, if the Legislature had made the 
entry of a judgment "subject to" a statutory provision, the effect of that 
judgment would be controlled and limed by the statute. Swan Magnetics, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.App.45h, 1504, 1510 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 541] 
( 1997) (italics supplied). 
The ISIF's obligation to pay the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 
45% of the current ASWS was "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" or 
"obedient to" or "subordinate to" the credit in paragraph 12 which clearly means that its 
obligation to begin paying full statutory TPD benefits begins after 90 weeks - not after 
250 weeks as it unreasonably argues now. 
When the Claimant signed the Stipulation on 6.6.14, he reasonably interpreted the 
phrase "subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12" to mean that the ISIF's liability 
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for paying full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable A WSW 
would begin after 90 weeks because that is when Employer's 250 week obligation ended 
after it had been "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed by" the same credit 
described in paragraph 12 (See Ex. 5). The phrase "subject to the credit" should be 
construed to mean the same thing when applied to both the Employer and the ISIP. Any 
other interpretation is strained and extremely damaging to the Claimant. 
The Claimant never would have signed the Stipulation if the ISIP's obligation to 
pay him full statutory TPD benefits was not "subject to the credit" because that would 
have left him without the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits for more than 3 years 
from week 90 when Employer stopped paying its share of his TPD benefits until week 
250 when ISIP would begin paying his full statutory TPD benefits. 
The ISIF's position that the phrase "subject to the credit" means absolutely 
nothing when it describes the ISIF's obligation to begin paying full statutory TPD 
benefits is unconscionable because it would essentially bankrupt the Claimant by 
depriving him of the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits and limiting him to a 
small differential payment based on the difference between 55% of the A WSW in 2004 
and the currently applicable 45% of the AWSW. 
The bottom line is that the ISIP drafted the Stipulation and specifically stated that 
its obligation to pay full statutory benefits was "subject to the credit discussed in 
paragraph 12"; i.e., it had to begin paying full statutory TPD benefits at 90 weeks instead 
of 250 weeks because its obligation was "subject to" or "controlled by" or "governed 
by" the credit just like the Employer's obligation to pay TPD benefits was "subject to" or 
"controlled by" or "governed by" the credit. 
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The Commission should give the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in 
paragraph 12" its plain and ordinary meaning and enter a declaratory ruling which 
requires the ISIP to begin paying its full statutory TPD benefit at 45% of the currently 
applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the stipulated date ofMMI on 10.1.13. 
(3) ANY AMBIGUITY OVER THE DATE WHEN THE ISIP MUST BEGIN 
PAYING THE CLAIMANT HIS FULL STATUTORY TOTAL AND 
PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST 
THE ISIP BECAUSE IT DRAFTED THE STIPULATION 
The Claimant contends that the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in 
paragraph 12" is not ambiguous because it is only susceptible of one reasonable 
interpretation and means the same thing when applied to both the Employer and the ISIP. 
However, If the Commission decides that the phrase "subject to the credit discussed in 
paragraph 12" is ambiguous because it is susceptible of 2 or more different 
interpretations, the Commission should construe that ambiguity against the ISIP and in 
favor of the Claimant because the ISIP drafted the Stipulation: 
The rules of construction of contracts and written documents in general 
apply to the interpretation of court orders. Evans v. City of American 
Falls, Idaho, 52 Idaho 7, 18, 11 P.2d 363 (1932); In re Callnan's Estate, 
70 Cal.2d 150, 74 Cal.Rptr. 250, 449 P.2d 186 (1969); Fidelity Union 
Trust Co. v. Byrne, 76 N.J.Super. 256, 184 A.2d 163 (1962). Interpretation 
of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. Cf Roberts v. 
Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1978) (contract case); Pollard 
Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344, 349 (1982) 
(contract case). On the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous 
document presents a question of law. Cf Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 
654, 660, 682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984) (contract case); Beal v. Mars Larsen 
Ranch Corp., Inc., 99 Idaho 662,668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1978). 
Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of 
law. Cf Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., IOI Idaho 783, 
789, 621 P.2d 399, 405 (1980) (contract case). Suchan v. Suchan, 113 
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986) ... 
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Moreover, the magistrate interpreted the order consistently with the 
general rule that written documents, if ambiguous, should be construed 
against the drafter. Cf Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 
506,519,201 P.2d 976 (1948) (contract case). Id 113 Idaho 108, 741 P.2d 
1295. 
The ISIP will ask the Commission to completely overlook the phrase "subject to 
the credit discussed in paragraph 12" and treat that phrase as a nullity so that the ISIF can 
avoid paying the Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits until 250 weeks after the 
stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13. The ISIF' s interpretation is not only inconsistent with 
the plain language of the stipulation, it is unconscionable because it would deprive the 
Claimant of his full TPD benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250. 
The Claimant cannot live on the small differential payment that he would receive 
from the ISIP based on the difference between Employer's obligation based on 55% of 
the 2004 AWSW and the currently applicable 45% of the A WSW. In 2015, that 
differential payment is only $16.35 per week X 4 = $65.40 per month. After paying 
attorney's fees, the Claimant would collect 75% of that amount or $49.05 per month. As 
indicated in his affidavit, the Claimant cannot live on that amount and needs to collect the 
full measure of his TPD benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable A WSW from 
10.1.13 until the day he dies (See Ex. 5). 
The Commission should construe the the Stipulation as a whole based on its 
stated purpose and give effect to the true meaning of the parties when the Stipulation was 
drafted; i.e., that the Claimant would receive the full measure of his statutory TPD 
benefits as "if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable 
for ... total and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" (See ~20, p. 8 of 
the Stipulation). 
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4. THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §72-804 
Even before the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in Corgatelli and held 
that there is no statutory basis under the Act to support granting the Employer an invalid 
credit against its obligation to pay the full measure TPD benefits for PPI benefits 
previously paid, the statutory provisions of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act did not 
allow for a PPI credit against TPD benefits. The Commission has never had the 
jurisdiction or the authority to judicially construct a credit that did not exist and then 
grant that invalid credit to an Employer. Therefore, it is obvious that the credit claimed 
by Employer in this case is void under Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711. 
The Claimant wrote to Employer and asked them to acknowledge that their PPI 
credit was invalid and do the right thing by either reimbursing the Claimant for the 
invalid credit that it took in violation of the Act or stipulate to amend the Stipulation to 
eliminate the credit. Employer rejected both requests with a terse 2-line response thereby 
placing the Claimant in the unreasonable position where he had no alternative but to file 
this Petition For Declaratory Relief (See Ex. 2). 
The Employer should be held liable for paying the Claimant's attorney's fees 
based on 30% of the invalid credit or $39,649.50 or $11,894.85 because it has contested 
the Claimant's claim for the full measure of his TPD benefits without reasonable grounds 
by claiming a PPI credit that is obviously invalid under the Act. 
The ISIP drafted the Stipulation which expressly made the ISIP' s obligation to 
pay Claimant the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits "subject to" the credit 
described in paragraph 12. The phrase "subject to the credit" is not ambiguous and 
should mean the same thing when applied to the ISIP that it means when applied to the 
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Employer; i.e., Employer's obligation to pay TPD benefits was shortened from 250 
weeks to 90 weeks and the start date for the ISIF's obligation to pay full statutory 
benefits based on 45% of the current A WSW was likewise shortened from 250 weeks to 
90 weeks. No other interpretation would make any sense because it would require the 
Claimant to go without the full measure of his TPD benefits for more than 3 years from 
week 90 to week 250. 
Even if the Commission construes the phrase "subject to" to be ambiguous and to 
mean something other than "controlled by" or "governed by" the credit, according to 
basic rules of contract construction, the ambiguous phrase must be interpreted against the 
ISIF since it drafted the ambiguous language in the Stipulation. 
After the Claimant's attempts to get Employer to do the right thing failed, the 
Claimant wrote to the ISIF and asked it to confirm in writing that it would begin paying 
Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the current A WSW after 90 
weeks from the date of MMI on 10.1.13. Following Employer's lead, the ISIF also 
rejected the Claimant's reasonable requests and refused to provide any explanation for its 
position with a terse 4 line-letter (See Ex. 4) thereby forcing him to file this Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling. 
The position taken by the ISIF over the date when it must begin paying the 
Claimant his full TPD benefits is unconscionable because it is not supported by any 
reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the Stipulation and would deprive the 
Claimant of the full statutory measure of his TPD benefits for more that 3 years. If the 
Commission does not enter an award of attorney's fees against Employer based on 30% 
of the invalid credit that it is claiming, then it should require the ISIF to pay the 
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Claimant's fees because it has contested the Claimant's right to receive the full measure 
of his statutory TPD benefits without reasonable grounds. 
(C) Conclusion 
The stated purpose of the Stipulation drafted by the ISIF was to provide the 
Claimant with "the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if this 
matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for... total and 
permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" (See ,r20 on page 8 of the 
Stipulation). 
If the Industrial Commission does not declare the invalid credit granted to 
Employer for PPI benefits previously paid void or declare that the ISIF must begin 
paying its full statutory measure of the Claimant's TPD benefits based on 45% of the 
currently applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the Claimant reached MMI on 10.1.13, the 
Employer will be relieved of its obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his 
TPD benefits and the Claimant will be forced to waive his right to receive the full 
measure of his TPD benefits in direct violation of the Act and the express terms of the 
Stipulation. 
For all of the above reasons, the Claimant respectfully requests a Declaratory 
Ruling from the Commission which declares the PPI credit claimed by Emproyer void or 
requires the ISIP to begin paying the full measure of the Claimant's TPD benefits based 
on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW 90 weeks after the 10.1.13 date ofMMI and 
requires both Defendants to pay the Claimant's attorney's fees. 
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Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February 2015. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By: iw_J)~ 
RICK D. KALLAS 
Attorney for Claimant 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Claimant's Memorandum In Support of Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling by the method indicated below upon the following persons: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam&Burke 
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
[ X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.384.5844 
M&W 
Rick D. Kallas 
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Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Rick D. Kallas * 
John C. DeFranco 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
• Licensed in Idaho and Oregon 
Via Facsimile 
(208) 384-5844 
Jon M. Bauman, Esq. 
Elam & Burke, PA 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
January 15, 2015 
Phone:(208)336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
Re: (1) 
(2) 
Request For Lump Sum Payment of Void 27% PPI Credit Claimed B~.mp~er / Surety 
Alternative Request For Stipulation To Amend 6.24.14 Stipulation To Eliminate Void Credit 
Davis v. llammack Management, Inc. & SIF 
LC. No. 05-501080 
Dear Mr. Bauman: 
The stated purpose of the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants filed with the Industrial Commission on 
6.24.14 was to provide the Claimant with "the full measure of benefits Claimant would be entitled to receive if this matter 
proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial 
injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law" 
(See 120 on page 8 of the Stipulation). However, the language set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation 
wrongfully gave Employer / Surety an undeserved credit toward its obligation to pay 250 weeks worth of TPD benefits 
based on the 27% PPI rating that Employer / Surety had paid to Claimant before the parties stipulated that the Claimant 
was totally and permanently disabled. 
Just 62 days after the Stipulation was entered in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there is no statutory basis in 
the Idaho workers' compensation act to give Employer/ Surety a credit for PPI benefits paid to the Claimant before he is 
deemed totally and permanently disabled (See Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 157 (2014). 
Because Employer/ Surety were not entitled to claim the 27% whole person PPI credit set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12 
of the Stipulation under Corgatelli and because the PPI credit described in paragraphs 11 and 12 would require the 
Claimant to waive his rights to receive full compensation for his total and permanent disability under the Idaho workers' 
compensation act, the PPI credit is not valid and enforceable under Idaho law (See Idaho Code §72-318(2) and the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009)). 
The 27% PPI credit claimed by Employer/ Surety is worth $39,649.50, calculated as follows: i.e., 27% X 500 weeks= 
135 weeks X 2004 PPI rate of $293.70 = $39,64950). In order to avoid having to amend the Stipulation entered by the 
Industrial Commission on 6.24.14, the Claimant respectfully requests that Employer / Surety pay him a lump sum 
payment of $39,649.50 to fully compensate him for his total and permanent disability benefits. In the alternative, if 
Davis, Gary/ l.15.15 Fax/ Ltr. Jon Bauman Page I 
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Employer I Surety will not pay the Claimant his full total and permanent disability benefits in a lump sum as requested, 
the Claimant requests that Employer I Surety prepare a stipulation to amend the 6.24.14 stipulation to eliminate the 
unearned and void credit for the payment of the 27% whole person PPI benefits previously paid. 
Please contact me at your convenience if you have any questions about the requests made in this letter. Thank you for 
your cooperation. 
Very truly yours, 
1~~~ 
CC: Client 
ISIF attorney Kenneth L. Mallea via facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
Davis, Gary/ I.15.15 Fax I Ltr. Jon Bauman Page 2 
54 
Exhibit 2 
55 
I •"-''V IIU'-
JON M. BAUMAN 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Poot Office Box 1539 
Bofse, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384--5844 
E-mail jmb®elamJrutt~,com 
VIA FACSIMILE 
# 345-8945 
Riok D. Kallas 
January 20. 2015 
ELLSWORTII, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
1031 East Park Boulevard 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Re: ClaimNo.: 
Claimant: 
Date of Injury; 
Employer: 
E&B File No.: 
Dear Mr. Kallas: 
200500871 
Gary Davis 
11/09/04 
Hammack Management, Inc. 
179-0174 
ELAM&BDRKE 
ATI'ORNEYSATLA.W 
I am in receipt of your letter of January 15, 2015, I have conferred with the Surety about 
the demand set forth in that letter. Your demand-is respectfully denied. 
JMB:sd 
cc: Vicki Baer 
Diane Evans 
Very truly yours, 
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.... 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Rick D. Kallas * 
John C. Defranco 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
• Licensed in Idaho and Oregon 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 SW 5th A venue 
P. 0. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680-0857 
February 2, 2015 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
Re: Request For Confirmation That ISIF Will Pay Full Statutory TPD Benefits After 90 Weeks 
Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc. and State Insurance Fund and State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund· 
J.C. No. 2005-501080 
Dear Mr. Mallea: 
When the parties entered into the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants and the Industrial 
Commission entered its Order pursuant thereto on 6.24.14, all of the parties and the Commission were operating 
on the premise that the purpose of the Stipulation was to provide the Claimant with "the full measure of benefits 
Claimant would be entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found to be liable 
for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for permanent partial impairment benefits and for 
total and permanent disability' income benefits pursuant to law" (See if20 on page 8 of the Stipulation). 
The total and permanent disability benefits that the Claimant is entitled to receive pursuant to the Stipulation were 
defined in paragraph 11: 
Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is entitled to be paid total and permanent disability 
benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average weekly state wage pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 72-408 and 72-409. ' 
Employer and ISIP divided responsibility for the Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits based on the 
formula announced by the Idaho Supreme Court in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dep't, 107 Idaho.109, 686 
P.2d 54 (1984). Paragraph 11 required Employer to pay 250 weeks worth of benefits beginning on the stipulated 
date ofMMI of 10.1.13 "subject to the credit described in paragraph 12, below." 
The phrase "subject to the credit in paragraph 12" was interpreted by all of the parties to mean that the ,r,'"-. 
Employer's 250 weeks of liability would be shortened to 90 weeks of liability based on Employer claiming a ., 
credit for 160 weeks of PPI / PPD benefits that Employer previously paid to Claimant prior to the date when the 0 • 
parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled. / 
' 
<Ji,~ 
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The language of paragraph 11 also made it clear that after the Employer satisfied its obligation to pay 250 weeks 
of benefits which was shortened to 90 weeks after being "subject to the credit in paragraph 12", the ISIF would 
begin paying Claimant his full statutory benefits based on 45% of the currently applicable AWSW: 
At the expiration of said 250 week period, subject to the credit discussed in paragraph 12, 
below, the ISIF will pay Claimant his full statutory income benefits, said amount being 45% of 
the then prevailing average state weekly wage, until Claimant's death (emphasis supplied). 
The phrase "subject to the credit in paragraph 12" means the same thing when applied to the ISIF as it meant 
when it was applied to Employer; i.e., that ISIF's obligation to begin paying the Claimant his full statutory total 
and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the A WSW would begin at 90 weeks instead of 250 weeks because 
the ISIF's obligation to pay full statutory benefits is "subject to the credit in paragraph 12" just like Employer's 
obligation was subject to the credit in paragraph 12. 
On 1.15.15, I wrote to the attorney for Employer, Jon Bauman, and advised him that 135 weeks of the credit 
Employer claimed in paragraph 12 for PPI benefits previously paid was invalid based on the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Corg4telli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 157 (2014) (Note: I faxed you a 
copy of my 1.15.15 letter to Mr. Bauman). Since Employer was not entitled to claim the invalid credit described 
in paragraph 12 of the stipulation, paragraph 12 must be considered void because it deprives the Claimant of the 
full measure of total and permanent disability benefits that he would be entitled to under the worker's 
compensation act and violates the express purpose of the Stipulation. 
To the extent that paragraph 12 requires the Claimant to waive his right to receive full total and permanent 
disability benefits in violation of the worker's compensation act and the stated purpose of the stipulation, the 
agreement is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(2) and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Wernecke v, St. 
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). I asked Employer to either pay the 
Claimant a lump sum for taking the invalid credit or stipulate to amend paragraph 12 of the 6.24.14 Stipulation to 
eliminate the invalid credit. Employer responded on 1.20.15 and rejected both options (See copy of Mr. Bauman's 
1.20.15 enclosed herewith). 
Given Employer's position that it is entitled to claim an invalid credit, if the ISIF takes the position that it does 
not have to begin paying the Claimant his full measure of statutory total and permanent disability benefits until· 
250 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13, the Claimant will have no alternative but to file a Petition 
For Declaratory Relief with the Industrial Commission because the unreasonable positions taken by Employer and 
ISIF will leave the Claimant without any total and permanent disability benefits for approximately 3 years from 
week 90 to week 250 (unless ISIF continues to pay a small differential payment from week 90 to week 250). 
Please confirm that ISIF will begin paying the Claimant his full statutory total and permanent disability benefits 
based on 45% of the currently applicable A WSW beginning 90 weeks after 10.1.13 based on the explicit language 
of paragraph 11 which makes the ISIF's liability to pay full statutory benefits "subject to the credit in paragraph 
12". If the ISIF will not begin paying the Claimant his full statutory total and permanent disability benefits 90 
weeks after 10.1.13, please explain why the ISIF is refusing to pay the Claimant the full measure of his total and 
permanent disability benefits in violation of the worker's compensation act and the express language of the 
stipulation. 
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Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Enclosure 
CC: Gary Davis 
Jon Bauman via facsimile@ 208.384.5844 
Very truly yours, 
'Rick- 1J. Xa{Cas 
Attorney at Law 
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KENNETH L. MALLEA 
AITORNEY AT LAW 
Rick D. Kallas 
I 031 East Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
78 SW 5TH AVENUE, SUITE I 
POST OFFICE Box 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680-0857 
February 5, 2015 
Re: Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc., State Insurance Fund, ISIF 
LC. Case No. 2005-501080 
Dear Mr. Kallas: 
I am in receipt of your letter dated February 2, 2015. 
TELEPHONE 
(208) 888-2790 
FAX 
(208) 888-2789 
E-lviAJL 
KLM@MALLEA.LA W.COM 
I have conferred with my client about your requested "confirmation" and, failing that, 
your request for an explanation. 
Your requests/demands are respectfully denied. 
KLM/dm 
cc: James F. Kile 
Jon Bauman 
;? 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
I 031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
E-mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
Attorney for Claimant 
i:5 FEB 2b A 8: 31 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND, 
. Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
Davis/ Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
LC. No. 2005 - 501080 
CLAIMANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
DECLARATORY RULING 
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Gary Davis, the Claimant, being first duly sworn on oath, states as follows: 
1. I am the Claimant in this case and make this affidavit based on my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. Before I signed the Stipulation For Entry of Award Against the Defendants in my case on 
June 6, 2014, I sat down in my attorney's office and read the Stipulation. At that time, it 
was my understanding that the State Insurance Fund had agreed to pay its share of my 
total and permanent disability benefits for 250 weeks after the date when the parties 
stipulated that I reached maximum medical improvement on October I, 2013. However, 
based on the language of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Stipulation, I understood that the 
State Insurance Fund was taking a credit against its obligation to pay 250 weeks worth of 
TPD benefits based on the 27% PPI award that it had paid to me and the 5% disability 
above impairment award it had paid to me before the parties stipulated that I was totally 
and permanently disabled by my industrial injmy. 
3. After the State Insurance Fund took the credits described in paragraph 12 oft.lie 
Stipulation, I knew that it would stop paying me its share of my TPD benefits 90 weeks 
after October 1, 2013. However, I was not concerned about losing those payments from 
the State Insurance Fund because it was my understanding that the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full statutory total and permanent disability 
benefits based on 45% of the current Average Weekly State Wage when the State 
Insurance Fund stopped making its payments. It did not matter to me who paid my 
benefits as long as I continued to receive the full measure ofmy benefits based on 45% of 
the current Average Weekly State Wage. 
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4. My understanding that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would begin paying my full 
statutory total and permanent disability benefits based on 45% of the current Average 
Weekly State Wage after 90 weeks was based on the plain language of paragraph 11 
which said that the State Insurance Fund's obligation to pay me was "subject to the 
credit" in paragraph 12 and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund's obligation was also 
"subject to the credit" in paragraph 12. In my mind, that meant that when the State 
Insurance Fund's obligation stopped after 90 weeks, the Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund's obligation to pay full benefits would start. 
5. Ifl would have known that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would take the position 
that it did not have to start paying me my full statutory total and permanent disability 
benefits until after 250 weeks, I never would have signed the Stipulation since it would 
require me to waive my right to receive the full measure of my statutory total and 
permanent disability benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250. 
6. I cannot live and pay my bills based on the small differential payment that I will receive 
from the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund based on the difference between 45% of the 
current Average Weekly State Wage and 55% of the Average Weekly State Wage for the 
year that I was injured back in 2004. 
7. Based on 45% of the Average Weekly State Wage in 2015, that differential payment is 
only $16.35 per week or $65.40 per month. After paying my attorney 25%, I will only 
receive $49.05 per month. 
8. I cannot live and pay my bills on $49.05 per month. Therefore, I am asking the Industrial 
Commission to not allow the State Insurance Fund to take the invalid credit for the 27% 
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whole person PPI award that it previously paid to me. I understand that the State 
Insurance Fund is legally entitled to take a credit for the 5% disability above impairment 
benefits that it paid to me on a voluntary basis and I do not have any objection to that 
credit. 
9. If the Industrial Commission is going to allow the State Insurance Fund to take the 27% 
PPI credit, then I would ask the Industrial Commission to require the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund to begin paying full statutory benefits based on 45% of the current 
Average Weekly State Wage when the State Insurance Fund payments stop after 90 
weeks from October 1, 2013. 
10. If the State Insurance Fund is allowed to stop making payments after 90 weeks from 
l 0.1.13 but the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund does not have to start paying my full 
statutory benefits until 250 weeks after 10.-1.13, I will not be able to survive on the small 
differential payment from the ISIF for more than 3 years. 
Further your Affiant Sayeth Naught. 
Dated this 25th day of February, 2015. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 25th day of February, 2015 
County of Ada ) 
: S.S. 
State of Idaho ) 
~V1W N~ Public For Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 'fwh..WXY lo) a01'1 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February 2015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Claimant's Affidavit In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling by the 
method indicated below upon the following persons: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. I 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam&Burke 
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
[ X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.384.5844 
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Jon M. Bauman 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Bauman - ISB #2989 
Attorney for Defendants, Employer and Surety 
ZU15 i I P Lt: 33 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL_ COMMISSION 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC. 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
LC. No. 2005-501080 [sic] 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S OBJECTION 
AND RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S. 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING 
WHICH INTERPRETS AND CLARIFIES 
THE STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
AW ARD AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND 
DISCHARGE ENTERED BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON 6.26.14 
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Defendants Employer and Surety (SIF) respond and object to Claimant's Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling Which Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against 
Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge Entered by the Industrial Commission on 
6.26.14 ("Petition") as follows. 
Claimant's Petition is in effect an attempt to modify an order or award of the Industrial 
Commission ("Commission"), namely, the Order of Approval and Discharge whereby the matter 
identified in the caption of the Petition was dismissed with prejudice on June 26, 2014. That 
matter having been dismissed with prejudice, it is final, concluded and forever discharged, by the 
express terms of the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants ("Stipulation") that the 
Commission approved and pursuant to which the Commission dismissed the Complaint in that 
matter with prejudice. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-718, "a decision of the commission; in the absence of 
fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing 
the decision in the office of the commission" unless a party sought reconsideration under Idaho 
Code Section 72-718 or "appeared pursuant to" Idaho Code Section 72-724. No party has 
sought reconsideration of or filed a notice of intent to appeal from the Order of Approval and 
Discharge entered by the Commission on June 26, 2014. 
Idaho Code Section 72-719 provides a limited basis upon which a party may seek to 
modify an award or agreement, but only for limited grounds, and within a limited time. 
Specifically, the application for modification must be made "within five (5) years of the date of 
the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease." Idaho 
Code Section 72-719(1). Claimant's Petition has been filed too late to comply with that 
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deadline. Moreover, Section 72-719 only permits modification of awards and agreements for 
"(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement; or (b) Fraud." 
Claimant's Petition fails to allege either of these circumstances. Therefore, the case identified 
in the caption of the Petition is final and concluded. Claimant cannot reopen that matter. 
Nevertheless, he has improperly filed a pleading as if the former matter were not concluded and 
fully discharged. Claimant should have filed a new pleading with a new docket number (I.C. 
No.) and served the respective parties. Claimant failed to do any of these things. He has 
improperly used the caption of a claim that was dismissed with prejudice and then served former 
counsel for the respective Defendants in that claim, rather than the parties themselves. Rule 
4(B)(l), J.R.P., requires service on "all other parties." See also Rule 15(D), J.R.P. 
Undersigned counsel was not authorized to act as the agent for Employer and Surety in the 
former proceeding once that proceeding was dismissed with prejudice and the Order of Approval 
and Discharge had been served on his respective clients. Thus, there has been a failure of 
service of the Petition. 
There is no occasion for the Commission to issue a ruling on the Petition because the 
matter in which the Petition was filed was dismissed with prejudice as of June 26, 2014 and 
Claimant failed, within the time allowed, to seek reconsideration of, appeal from, or assert 
grounds for modifying the order dismissing that matter with prejudice. Thus, there is no "actual 
controversy" for the Commission to resolve as required by Rule 15(F)(4)(b), J.R.P. The 
controversy that existed among the parties has been fully and finally resolved by the 
Commission's order approving the Stipulation and dismissing the matter with prejudice. 
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Claimant's effort to invent a controversy is improper. Claimant seeks to give retroactive 
application to a decision that the Idaho Supreme Court issued on August 25, 2014, almost two 
months after the Commission dismissed the former proceedings with prejudice: Corgatelli v. 
Steel West, Inc. Claimant cites no authority for the proposition that a dismissal with prejudice 
resulting from approval of a Stipulation may be overturned whenever the Idaho Supreme Court, 
or any other tribunal, may issue a decision that, had it been in effect prior to the final disposition 
of a case, might arguably have affected some of the rights of one or more of the parties to the 
former proceeding. The notion Claimant urges is unsupported by law and has the potential to 
work vast mischief, as it would completely undermine the finality of any decision or award, even 
where no party had ever sought reconsideration of, appealed from, or asserted appropriate 
grounds for modifying the decision or award within the time permitted by law. 
Claimant implicitly suggests that the Commission has not relinquished jurisdiction of this 
matter. But as the Commission has previously held, "This argument stands the notion of finality 
of an award on its head. A Commission decision is a final disposition of matters adjudicated. 
Idaho Code Section 72-718." Further, "[w]hen the Commission deems it necessary to retain 
jurisdiction after an award it expressly so states. This express action is necessary to hold open 
an otherwise finally decided matter." Frank v. The Bunker Hill Company, I.C. 80-341382, 2003 
WL 23064623 (Dec. 12, 2003). (This holding was affirmed in Frank v. The Bunker Hill 
Company, 142 Idaho 126, 130-131, 124 P.3d 1002, 1006-1007 (2005), citing Fowler v. City of 
Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 2-3, 773 P.2d 269, 270-271.) Here, there is no claim that the 
Commission explicitly retained jurisdiction of this matter, and even if such a claim were made, 
there is no evidence to support such a claim. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred merely by filing 
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an improper pleading under an old and inoperative case number. Thus, the Commission should 
dismiss or deny Claimant's Petition pursuant to Rule 15(F)(4)(a), J.R.P. 
As the Commission held in Fodge v. Glen Fodge dba Fodge Logging, LC. No. 
90-720094, 1998 WL 354229 (May 29 1998), "without finality all other aspects of the 
procedural process would be rendered moot." The Commission added there that Idaho Code 
Section 72-719 allows reopening of a case based upon fraud, "but only within five years after the 
accident causing the injury or occupation[ al] disease. Such a time restriction emphasizes the 
obligation of the parties to diligently prosecute the case to hearing and of the Commission to 
timely issue its decisions." The Commission went on to add "Applications for modification of 
an award due to fraud must be made within five years of the accident causing the injury. The 
motion to reopen was not filed until November of 1997, nearly two years past the statute of 
limitations. To allow the Defendant's [sic] to reopen in this instance would open the flood gates 
to relitigation of any case for an allegation of fraud. That is not the intent of Idaho Code, 
Section 72-718. Defendant's motion is barred by the five-year statute oflimitations under Idaho 
Code, Section 72-719." 
If Claimant's view were allowed to prevail, no decision of the Commission dismissing a 
case with prejudice would ever be final. A party could lie in wait and return to the Commission 
at any time, even years after the matter was resolved, in hopes that some newly- developed 
provision of law might - if retroactively applied - provide some new or additional relief beyond 
that to which the party had already and long since agreed. Countless instances might be 
imagined where a party who settled a claim learned, months or years later, of a change in the 
law. Meanwhile, in reliance on the Commission's order approving an award and dismissing the 
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Complaint with prejudice, the other parties doubtless, and reasonably, changed their position. 
Witnesses may have died or moved away. Medical records may have been purged. There are 
compelling reasons the statutes provide for finality of decisions and awards. 
In this case, Claimant was represented by legal counsel. He voluntarily entered into the 
Stipulation as appears from his acknowledged signature and that of his attorney. Moreover, the 
Stipulation was not a one-sided, take-it-or-leave-it contract. Claimant's attorney requested the 
inclusion of particular language in the Stipulation concerning attorney fees and his wishes were 
accommodated in that regard. "Even at common law, a party who has signed an agreement is 
bound by it, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence." See, e.g., Lawrence v. 
Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,898,204 P.3d 532,538 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An agreement entered into 
in good faith in order to settle adverse claims is binding upon the parties, and absent a showing 
of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity."); St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501,507,861 P.2d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 1992) ("The 
agreement to compromise and settle is binding in the absence of fraud, duress or undue 
influence."). 
Claimant asserts none of these grounds. Indeed, having dismissed the Complaint with 
prejudice, the Commission no longer has jurisdiction over the former proceeding. Thus, 
pursuant to Rule 15(f)(4)(a)&(b), the Commission should decline to entertain the Petition or 
enter a declaratory ruling. For the foregoing reasons, Claimant's Petition should be denied. 
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Respectfully submitted this / ( day of March, 2015. 
~aut~Wl)fthe Firm 
omeys for Defendants, Employer and Surety 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _!_j_ day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Rick D. Kallas 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
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Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
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P.O. Box 857 
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_k U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivery 
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COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"), by 
and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby makes a limited appearance before the 
Industrial Commission in response to Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Which 
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Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation for Entry of A ward against Defendants and Order of 
Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2014 
("Petition"). JRP 15 addresses declaratory rulings before the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. JRP 15E provides that: "Within fourteen days after service of a Petition, any 
party served may file a written response thereto ... " This Response is made by the ISIP for 
the limited purpose of seeking dismissal of the Petition on grounds that the Commission 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition, and that the service of the Petition 
violates the Rules of Practice and Procedure which in turn results in a failure of personal 
jurisdiction over the ISIP with respect to the Petition. Although the Commission's ~ules of 
Practice and Procedure do not specifically address a limited appearance for the purpose of 
contesting subject matter and personal jurisdiction, undersigned counsel believes that the 
Commission may look to IRCP l 2(b) by way of analogy and by way of guidance in 
reviewing the ISIF limited appearance Response. 
More specifically, and again by way of analogy, the ISIP's limited appearance in 
this proceeding would be analogous to motions filed under IRCP 12(b) (1) and (5). 
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings 
except in the context of pre-hearing discovery, the concepts of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the claim and over the purported Defendant are basic concepts of administrative 
law and of Industrial Commission practice. Again, by analogy, we can look to the analysis 
under IRCP 12(b) for guidance. 
A. The Industrial Commission Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the 
Petition. 
The Petition purports to be a continuation of Industrial Commission Case No 2005-
501080. That case was fully and finally concluded by the Industrial Commission's Order 
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of Approval and Discharge entered June 26, 2014. The Order of Approval and Discharge 
specifically stated that "the complaint is dismissed with prejudice." No reconsideration 
under Idaho Code §72-718 was sought by Claimant. No appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court pursuant to Idaho Code §72-724 was taken. The Order of Approval and Discharge 
fully and finally concluded all matters with respect to Case No. 2005-501080. 
The case having been fully and finally concluded, and the complaint against this 
Defendant being dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Industrial Commission's Order, 
there is no continuing subject matter jurisdiction regarding Case No. 2005-501080. There 
is no continuing jurisdiction of this Commission over that dismissed case. The Claimant, 
by simply attaching a case number to a pleading, may not revive, reinstate or continue a 
proceeding which had been dismissed with prejudice and by final order. 
The concept of subject matter jurisdiction speaks to the power of the tribunal to 
entertain the case and to adjudicate the claim or controversy. Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 
September 19, 2014 Idaho Supreme Court Op. No. 101. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot 
be conferred by a self-serving and legally wrong pleading. 
There is no doubt that the Commission has general jurisdiction to entertain a 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling as set forth in JRP 15A. However, the Commission does 
not have jurisdiction to entertain a Petition for Declaratory Ruling under a case which has 
been conclusively and finally dismissed with prejudice. A Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
is necessarily a new case, resting on its own merits ( or lack thereof) and is not based upon 
the pleadings, record, testimony, discovery, claim and defenses asserted by the parties in 
the prior and dismissed case 2005-501080. 
In proceeding in this limited appearance, the ISIP is not intending to frustrate the 
liberal provisions of Idaho Code §72-708 or to unduly constrict the application of JRP 15. 
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But the instant Petition is necessarily a new proceeding which is governed by JRP 15 and 
which is separate and apart from the normal process of a complaint, service thereof on the 
ISIF, and the filing of an answer and other affirmative defenses by the ISIF. There is 
simply no way for this Claimant to leg into the entirety of the record in Case No. 2005-
501080 or for this Claimant to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Commission in a 
fully and finally adjudicated proceeding. In the event of appeal of any final ruling on any 
appropriate and proper petition to come before the Commission by this Claimant, the 
record on appeal certainly should not include the entirety of the Clerk's record in Case No. 
2005-501080. This is an entirely new, separate, and distinct claim and the ISIF does not 
consent to the validity of the Petition as a continuation of Case No. 2005-501080 and 
submits that the Industrial Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the Petition. 
B. The Petition Has Not Been Properly Served Upon the ISIF. 
As noted, the ISIF is making a limited and special appearance to contest jurisdiction 
of the Industrial Commission over the Petition. Valid service of process is a condition 
precedent to the tribunal's jurisdiction over the "person" of the Defendant. JRP 4 addresses 
service of a Workers Compensation Complaint. JRP 4(B)(l) mandates that the party filing 
a Complaint shall serve "all other parties." Subsection (B)(2) mandates that the pleading 
shall be served upon the last known address of the respective party. The ISIF has no agent 
as may be present regarding an Employer or Surety. Undersigned counsel is not the agent 
of the ISIF for purposes of service of process. JRP 15 likewise addresses service of a 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling. JRP 15(D) requires the Petitioner to serve a copy of the 
Petition "on all other persons to the actual controversy at the time the Petition is filed with 
the Commission." JRP 15(B) provides that "person" shall be construed to include 
"governmental agency or department," which the ISIF undoubtedly is. 
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As noted in the Petition, the pleading was purportedly "served" by mailing a copy 
to undersigned counsel. Yet undersigned counsel is not the agent for the ISIF and is not 
authorized to accept service of process of any complaint or any Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling. 
Service of process is the due process procedure which vests a tribunal with 
jurisdiction over a person or a party. McG!oon v. Gwinn, 140 Idaho 727, 100 P.3d 621 
(2004). Service of process is not a technical or trivial concept in law or in proceedings 
before the Idaho Industrial Commission. The Commission's own rules address service of 
process and mandate that a petition or pleading must be served directly upon a party. Valid 
service of process in accordance with the Commission rules is a condition precedent to the 
Commission's jurisdiction over a party, and in this case, over the ISIP. 
C. Conclusion. 
As in District Court cases, the failure of the ISIF to raise at this preliminary 
juncture, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, could be said to 
constitute a waiver. The ISIP therefore respectfully comes forward at this early part of the 
proceeding to lodge its objections to the continuation of this proceeding. The disposition of 
the pending Petition under JRP 15(F)(4) should be dismissal for the failure of subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the ISIP. The pending Petition should be 
dismissed. ~ 
DATED this// day of March, 2015. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
J~/fe~ 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Defendant ISIP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the// day of March, 2015, a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Rick D. Kallas 
1031 East Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83712 
Attorney for Claimant 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Employer/Surety 
X by U.S. mail 
__ by facsimile 
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Rick D. Kallas 
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1031 E. Park Blvd. 
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Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
E-mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
Attorney for Claimant 
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(A) INTRODUCTION 
The Claimant is filing a consolidated Reply Memorandum In Support of his Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling that addresses the 3 .11.15 written response from the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund (ISIF) and the 3 .11.15 written response from Employer / Idaho State Insurance 
Fund (Employer). 
(B) REBUTTAL OF THE ISIF'S ARGUMENTS 
1. THE WDICAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DO NOT AUTHORIZE THE 
FILING OF A LIMITED APPEARANCE 
Idaho Code §72-508 authorizes the Industrial Commission to promulgate reasonable rules 
and regulations to accomplish the purposes of the Act. Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-508, the 
Industrial Commission promulgated the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure (JRP). 
According to Idaho Code §72-508, those rules "shall be binding in the administration of this 
law". JRP 15 - Declaratory Rulings - sets forth a very specific procedure that must be followed 
when any interested person asks the Industrial Commission "for rulings on the construction, 
validity, or applicability of any workers' compensation statute, rule, or order" JRP 15(A). 
After the Petitioner served his Petition For Declaratory Ruling on the Employer and the 
ISIF, "any party served may file a written response thereto, stating with specificity the facts and 
the law on which the responding party relies". JRP 15(E) (underline supplied). The language of 
JRP 15(E) is clear and unambiguous. JRP 15(E) only allows the party served with a Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling to file one written response. The ISIF made the voluntary tactical decision to 
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limit its one written response to the filing of a "limited appearance" which is not even 
authorized by the JRP. 
The ISIF has admitted in its written response that "the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure do not specifically address a limited appearance for the purpose of contesting 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction" (Seep. 2, LL 9-13). The ISIF has also admitted that 
"the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings except in the 
context of pre-hearing discovery" (See p. 2, LL 16-17). 
After making those binding admissions, the ISIF then asked the Industrial Commission to 
judicially construct a new limited appearance rule and insert it into the Judicial Rules of Practice 
and Procedure "by way of analogy" to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Without following 
the proper rule making procedure for creating a new rule and adding it to the Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, the Industrial Commission does not have the authority to judicially 
construct a new limited appearance rule by analogy to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
With the exception of the limited discovery tools authorized by JRP 7(C), the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply to proceedings before the Industrial Commission: 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure govern m the district courts and the 
magistrate's division of the district courts. I.R.C.P. l(a). The Industrial 
Commission is not a division of the district court. See I.C. § 72-501(1) (statutory 
creation of the Industrial Commission as an executive department of the state 
government). Furthermore, the Commission has the authority to "promulgate and 
adopt reasonable rules and regulations involving judicial matters" and to the 
extent the regulations are consistent with law, they are binding. I.C. § 72-508. 
Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 311, 179 P.3d 265, 274 (2008). 
The Commission is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but it does 
have its own rules of procedure. Vawter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 155 Idaho 
903,318 P.3d 893,901 (2014). 
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Since the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure do not authorize a limited appearance 
and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings, the 
Industrial Commission should not consider the subject matter and personal jurisdiction 
arguments advanced by the ISIF in its unauthorized limited appearance. However, in the event 
that the Industrial Commission elects to consider the arguments made by the ISIP in its limited 
appearance, the Commission should reject each of the ISIF's arguments because they lack merit. 
2. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO DECIDE 
THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE CLAIMANT'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
RULING 
The ISIP argues that the Industrial Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction 
to clarify the parties' rights, duties and obligations under the Idaho Code §72-711 Compensation 
Agreement 1 because the Industrial Commission entered an Order of Approval and Discharge 
pursuant thereto on 6.26.14. The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Williams v. Blue Cross of 
Idaho, 151 Idaho 51, 260 P.3d 1186 (2011) soundly refutes the ISIF's lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction argument. 
In Williams, the Claimant entered into a final lump sum settlement agreement with the 
State Insurance Fund which was finalized and approved by the Industrial Commission. After the 
settlement agreement was finalized and approved by the Commission, the Claimant filed a 
Petition For Declaratory Ruling asking the Commission for a Declaratory Ruling that clarified 
the legal rights of all interested persons to the settlement proceeds (including the rights of a non-
party subrogee). 
1 In this case, the Compensation Agreement at issue was entitled by the Defendants as a Stipulation For Entry of Award Against 
Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge. 
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Before the Commission clarified the legal rights of the interested persons, it asked the 
parties to submit briefs on the question of whether the Industrial Commission had subject matter 
jurisdiction to decide the issues raised by the Petition. Both parties argued that the Industrial 
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights pursuant to the 
finalized and approved lump sum agreement. The Commission disagreed with the parties and 
ruled that it had proper subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights. 
Although neither party challenged the Commission's exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction 
sua sponte and held that the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to determine all interested 
persons' legal rights in the lump sum agreement that had already been finalized and approved by 
the Commission just like the Compensation Agreement in this case: 
We conclude that the Commission had jurisdiction to consider whether Blue 
Cross is a subrogee, rather than a creditor, under I.C. § 72-802, and that the 
Commission also had jurisdiction to determine the extent of Blue Cross' 
entitlement to the settlement proceeds. According to I.C. § 72-707, " [a]II 
questions arising under [the workers' compensation laws of this state], if not 
settled by agreement or stipulation of the interested parties with the approval of 
the commission, except as otherwise herein provided, shall be determined by the 
commission." I.C. § 72-707. Generally, the Commission's jurisdiction is limited to 
adjudicating " certain complaints filed by a workers' compensation claimant 
against an employer or an employer's surety." Owsley v. Idaho Indust. Comm'n, 
141 Idaho 129, 134, 106 P.3d 455, 460 (2005) (emphasis omitted). However, the 
Commission may properly exercise jurisdiction in cases, like this one, where the 
Commission is asked to clarify a claimant's rights under a lump sum settlement 
agreement. Pursuant to LC. § 72-404, the Commission has the responsibility to 
approve lump sum settlement agreements and in doing so, must determine that the 
settlement is in the best interest of the parties. It necessarily follows that the 
Commission has jurisdiction to clarify a claimant's rights under a lump sum 
settlement agreement that is presented for Commission approval. Id. 151 Idaho 
54-55, 260 P.3d 1189-1190 ..... 
Although the case at hand concerns the subrogation of a third-party insurer rather 
than the SIF, both instances require clarification of a worker's rights arising under 
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workers' compensation law. According to the statutory mandates in J.C. §§ 72-
707, -803, and -404 mentioned above, the Commission is the proper tribunal to 
clarify such rights, particularly in the case of a lump sum settlement where a 
claim for medical services is at issue. Williams, by filing this declaratory 
judgment action, was essentially asking the Commission to clarify his rights to the 
proceeds of the lump sum settlement agreement that he entered into with the SIF, 
particularly in light of Blue Cross' claim for a portion of the settlement proceeds 
that it argued were for amounts it paid for medical services provided to Williams. 
In order to determine Williams' rights under the settlement agreement, the 
Commission necessarily had to determine whether Blue Cross was a subrogee. In 
determining that Blue Cross was a subrogee, the Commission implicitly 
determined that Williams was not entitled to all of the lump sum proceeds 
because Blue Cross had paid Williams' disputed medical bills and, therefore, Blue 
Cross, as a subrogee, assumed Williams' legal right to attempt to collect payment 
for such expenses. Consequently, the Commission had jurisdiction to consider 
whether Blue Cross is a subrogee because Blue Cross' status as subrogee directly 
affects Williams' entitlement under the lump sum settlement agreement. 
Further, although the Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the 
extent of Blue Cross's subrogation entitlement, such a determination was also 
within its authority and was, in fact, necessary to determine whether the lump sum 
settlement was in the parties' best interest. As mentioned above, the Commission 
must approve all lump sum settlement agreements, and in doing so, it is the 
Commission's responsibility to ensure that the settlement is in the best interest of 
the parties. J.C. § 72-404. This is a responsibility that the Commission must 
scrupulously honor. See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist.# 401, 147 Idaho 
277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1017 (2009). If an injured worker's insurance company 
has provided compensation for medical expenses for which the worker is now 
seeking to obtain workers' compensation benefits, it is in the best interest of the 
parties to ensure that the insurance company's subrogation claim is resolved 
contemporaneously with the proposed settlement. This would help ensure that the 
parties will not be subjected to further litigation after the settlement agreement is 
finalized. Coupled with the jurisdiction grants in J.C. §§ 72-707 and -803, section 
72-404 requires the Commission to do so. 
It is also worth noting that before approving the lump sum settlement agreement 
in this case, the Commission could and should have requested that the parties 
stipulate as to how the lump sum settlement proceeds were to be allocated, 
including what portion was to be allocated to Blue Cross for payment of the 
disputed medical bills. Therefore, pursuant to its authority, the Commission could 
have attempted to get the parties to stipulate as to how the settlement proceeds 
were to be allocated and, failing such agreement, determined the entitlement of 
each. Williams, supra, 151 Idaho 155-156, 260 P.3d 1190-1191 (emphasis 
supplied). 
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The rationale for the holding in the Williams applies to this case. Just like the 
Commission was asked to review the final lump sum agreement in Williams pursuant to Idaho 
Code §72-404, the Commission in this case was asked to review and approve the Compensation 
Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-711. Williams makes it abundantly clear that the 
Industrial Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights under the 
Compensation Agreement and the workers' compensation Act as requested by the Claimant in 
his Petition For Declaratory Ruling. The Commission should reject the ISIF's lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction argument because it lacks merit. 
3. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
The ISIP argues that the Industrial Commission lacks personal jurisdiction over the ISIP 
because the Claimant served his Petition For Declaratory Ruling on the Defense attorney for ISIP 
who first appeared as the ISIP' s attorney of record on 9 .11.11 when he signed the ISIP' s Answer 
to the Complaint that Employer filed against the ISIP. From the date of his initial appearance on 
9 .11.11 to the date when the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order of Approval and 
Discharge which approved the parties' stipulated Compensation Agreement, the same Defense 
attorney has appeared as the attorney of record for the ISIP throughout these proceedings. 
If the ISIF's attorney wished to withdraw as the attorney of record for the ISIP in these 
proceedings, he had to comply with the mandatory withdrawal procedures set forth in JRP 14. 
B. Leave to Withdraw. Except as provided above, or by stipulation between an 
attorney and his or her client, no attorney may withdraw as an attorney of record 
without first obtaining approval by the Commission. A request to withdraw shall 
be made by filing a motion, supported by affidavit, with the Commission and 
served on all parties to the action, including the client. The Commission may 
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grant leave to withdraw as counsel of record on a showing of a factual basis to 
establish good cause and on such conditions as will prevent any delay in 
determination and disposition of the pending action. JRP 14(B). 
Since Defense counsel for ISIF never filed a Motion For Leave to Withdraw and never 
obtained an Order from the Industrial Commission authorizing him to withdraw, he is still the 
attorney of record for the ISIP and was the appropriate agent to receive service of the Claimant's 
Petition For Declaratory Ruling on behalf of the ISIF. Since the Claimant properly served the 
ISIF' s attorney of record, the Industrial Commission has proper personal jurisdiction over the 
ISIF in these proceedings. 
The ISIF argues that the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling should be treated as 
an entirely separate and distinct cause of action. However, that argument lacks merit. The 
Claimant has but one cause of action against Employer and the ISIP arising out of his 11.9.04 
industrial accident. Just because the Claimant's one cause of action may have resulted in 
multiple hearings, multiple orders or multiple declaratory rulings, that does not change the 
singular nature of the one cause of action which exists between the Claimant, the Employer and 
the ISIF. 
The Commission's decision was in error because collateral estoppel does not 
apply to this case, which involved multiple hearings but one cause of action. 
Collateral estoppel " precludes relitigation of the same issue in a separate cause of 
action." Id A cause of action is a " group of operative facts giving rise to one or 
more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a 
remedy in court from another person .... " Black's Law Dictionary 251 (9th ed. 
2009). 
Here, all of the orders deal with the same operative facts related to Vawter's 
employment with UPS, so the orders do not deal with separate factual situations. 
Therefore, all the hearings and orders address only one cause of action. See Sanije 
Berisha, Claimant, IC 2002-003038, 2012 WL 2118142 (Idaho Ind.Com. May 30, 
2012) (" Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the 
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litigation, albeit including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the 
same case."). Vawter, supra, 318 P3d. 903-904. 
Since the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling is part of the same cause of action 
against the Defendants which arose from the Claimant's 11.9.04 industrial accident, it was 
proper for the Claimant to serve the ISIP through its Defense attorney of record who has never 
obtained an Order from the Commission authorizing him to withdraw as the ISIF's attorney of 
record. The ISIF was properly served by mailing the Petition to its attorney of record and the 
Industrial Commission has proper personal jurisdiction over the ISIP. 
4. THE ISIP DOES NOT HA VE THE RIGHT TO FILE A SECOND WRITTEN RESPONSE 
JRP 15(E) limited the ISIF to filing one written response in opposition to the Claimant's 
2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling. By making the tactical decision to limit the scope of its 
one written response to a limited appearance which attacked the Commission's exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, the ISIP has exhausted its rights under JRP 
15(E) and cannot file a second written response challenging the merits of the Claimant's Petition: 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage." 
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981). " It is a 
voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value 
or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his option have demanded 
and insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 368, 304 P.2d 646, 649 
(1956). Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp, 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 
(2009). 
The ISIF made the voluntary tactical decision to forego its right to address the substantive 
merits of the Claimant's Petition and chose instead to place all of its eggs in one basket and focus 
exclusively on the subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction issues. By making that 
voluntary election, the ISIF has exhausted its legal rights under JRP 15(E) and cannot file a 
second written response to challenge the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling. 
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(C) REBUTTAL OF EMPLOYER'S ARGUMENTS 
1. THE CLAIMANT SEEKS A DECLARATORY RULING THAT THE PPI CREDIT 
GRANTED TO EMPLOYER IN THE COMMISSION'S 6.26.14 ORDER IS VOID 
Employer has mischaracterized the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling as an 
untimely Motion To Modify a final Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-719. The Claimant is not 
seeking an Order which modifies the Commission's 6.26.14 Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
719. The Claimant is asking the Commission for a Declaratory Ruling that the PPI credit it gave 
to Employer in its 6.26.14 Order is void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-711 
and Idaho Code §72-318 because there was no statutory basis which authorized the Commission 
to give Employer a PPI credit against its obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his 
statutory total and permanent disability (TPD ) benefits. 
Employer fails to appreciate the difference between a void order which has no legal effect 
from the moment it is created and a valid order which can later be modified pursuant to Idaho 
Code §72-719. The 6.26.14 Order is void ab initio since the Commission did not have the 
statutory authority to judicially construct a PPI credit against the Claimant's TPD benefits. 
Therefore, the invalid credit that was granted to Employer exceeds the jurisdiction of the 
Commission and must be declared void. 
2. THE COMMISSION HAS PROPER SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OVER EMPLOYER 
Employer makes the same lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction 
arguments that were made by the ISIF and rebutted in sections (B) (2) and (3) above. The 
Petition For Declaratory Ruling is not a separate cause of action which requires a new caption 
and a new case number. This is a single cause of action that arises out of the same industrial 
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accident on 11.9.04 and involves the same operative facts and the same parties. 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams, the Commission obviously has subject 
matter jurisdiction to resolve all disputed issues that arise under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act pursuant to Idaho Code §72-707. The Commission also has subject matter 
jurisdiction to clarify the Claimant's rights under a Compensation Agreement that was approved 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711. 
The Defense attorney for Employer has been the attorney of record in this case for 
approximately 9 years since he filed Employer's Answer to the Complaint on 5.22.06. If the 
Defense attorney wished to withdraw as attorney of record for Employer, then he had a duty to 
comply with the mandatory leave to withdraw requirements of JRP 14(B) and file a Motion For 
Leave to Withdraw with the Industrial Commission and obtain an Order authorizing him to 
withdraw. Since Defense counsel failed to file a Motion To Withdraw, he remained Employer's 
attorney of record. Therefore, it was perfectly appropriate for Claimant to serve Employer 
through its attorney of record with his 2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling. Both Employer 
and the ISIP have been properly served in this Declaratory Ruling proceeding and the Industrial 
Commission has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over both Defendants. 
3. THE CLAIMANT HAS AN ACTUAL CONTROVERSY WITH BOTH EMPLOYER AND 
THEISIF 
Employer argues that there is no actual controversy between Claimant and Employer 
because any controversy that previously existed was fully and finally resolved by the 6.26.14 
Order approving the Compensation Agreement. Again, Employer fails to appreciate the 
distinction between a void Order which is void ab initio and a valid Order which becomes final 
and cannot be modified except under the limited circumstances described in Idaho Code §72-
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719. A void Order has no legal meaning or effect and cannot be considered a valid final Order 
that resolves all of the controversies between the parties. 
The Claimant carefully framed the actual controversy which exists with Employer over 
the void PPI credit and the actual controversy which exists with the ISIP over the date when its 
obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits begins in his Petition For Declaratory Ruling and 
his Memorandum in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling. 
Employer is taking an invalid PPI credit against its obligation to pay full TPD benefits in 
direct violation of Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711. That 
actual controversy will deprive the Claimant of 55% of the 2004 AWSW from week 90 to week 
225 and will cost the Claimant $39,649.50 in TPD benefits. 
The ISIP is taking the position that it does not have to begin paying the Claimant his full 
statutory TPD benefits at 45% of the currently applicable A WSW until week 250 even though 
the Stipulation clearly states that the ISIF's obligation is "subject to" the invalid PPI credit being 
claimed by Employer. That actual controversy will deprive Claimant of his full statutory TPD 
benefits for more than 3 years from week 90 to week 250. 
Based on the record before the Commission, there can be no dispute that an actual 
controversy exists between the Claimant and the Defendants which could cost the Claimant more 
than 3 years of TPD benefits. 
5. THE COMMISISON DID NOT HAVE A VALID STATUTORY BASIS TO GRANT 
EMPLOYER AN INVALID PPI CREDIT EVEN BEFORE CORGATELLI WAS DECIDED 
Employer argues that the Claimant seeks to give retroactive application to the holding in 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) which was decided on 8.25.14, 
approximately 60 days after the Commission approved the invalid PPI credit in this case on 
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6.26.14. 
Both the Idaho State Insurance Fund and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund were 
named Defendants in the Corgatelli case. That means that when the Defendants in this case 
signed the Stipulation in June of 2014, they had already filed their written briefs and made their 
oral arguments to the Idaho Supreme Court in Corgatelli. Both Defendants were intimately 
familiar with the legal arguments being made in Corgatelli and knew that the Idaho Supreme 
Court could issue an opinion any moment that would prevent tl;te State Insurance Fund from 
taking the invalid PPI credit against the Claimant's TPD benefits. 
Although both Defendants had insider knowledge of the arguments being made in 
Corgatelli, Employer and the ISIP chose to remain silent in this case. Neither Defendant notified 
Claimant that the $39,649.50 PPI credit being taken by Employer might be declared invalid by 
the Idaho Supreme Court at any moment. Instead, they signed the Stipulation in June of 2014 
hoping that the 20-day time frame for filing a Motion For Reconsideration and the 42-day time 
frame for filing an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court would expire and they could hide behind 
an "alleged" fmal Order and argue that an invalid credit became valid because it was merged into 
a fmal Order. 
Even if Employer is correct and the holding in Corgatelli cannot be applied retroactively 
to the 6.26.14 Order, that does not address the fundamental statutory arguments made by the 
Claimant pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711; i.e., 
that the PPI credit granted to Employer must be declared void under Idaho Code §72-318 and 
Idaho Code §72-711 because there were no statutory provisions in the worker's compensation 
Act which authorized the Commission to grant Employer a PPI credit against its obligation to 
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pay the full measure ofTPD benefits. 
Since the Commission acted beyond the jurisdiction granted to it by statute when it 
granted Employer the invalid PPI credit, the PPI credit provisions of the Compensation 
Agreement and Order of Approval and Discharge must be declared void and set aside pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711. Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-318 and 
Idaho Code §72-711 were all in effect when the Industrial Commission entered its Order of 
Approval and Discharge on 6.26.14. 
Employer argues that an invalid agreement can be made valid by simply calling it a final 
Order. Employer's logic is flawed. Under Idaho Code §72-711, the PPI credit provisions of the 
6.26.14 Compensation Agreement and Order never became a valid final Order because the 
Commission only had jurisdiction to approve the final agreement of the parties "when the terms 
conform to the provisions of this law" and the PPI credit granted to Employer obviously did not 
conform to the provisions ofidaho Code §72-408. 
The PPI credit provisions of the Compensation Agreement in this case clearly did not 
conform to the provisions of the law because they relieved the Employer of its obligation to pay 
full TPD benefits in direct violation ofidaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Cod §72-318(1) and they 
required the Claimant to waive his rights to receive full TPD compensation under the Act in 
direct violation ofidaho Code§72-408 and Idaho Code §72-318(2). 
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that any agreement which requires the 
Employee to waive his right to receive full compensation under the Act must be declared void: 
Section 72-318(2) sets out the State's policy that agreements purporting to waive 
an employee's rights to compensation under the Act are void. Wernecke v. St. 
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1117 
(2009). 
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Conclusion 
JRP 15(E) gave the ISIP the right to file one written response in opposition to the 
Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling. The ISIP did not address the substantive merits of 
any of the Claimant's statutory arguments or contract construction arguments in its written 
response. Likewise, the ISIP did not object to the Claimants' request for an award of attorney's 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. Instead, the ISIP chose to limit its response to a limited 
appearance challenge to subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Judicial Rules of Practice 
and Procedure do not authorize a limited appearance. 
Since the ISIP did not oppose any of the Claimant's requests for declaratory relief or the 
Claimant's request for attorney's fees, the Claimant requests a Declaratory Ruling which 
requires the ISIF to begin paying Claimant his full statutory TPD benefits based on 45% of the 
current AWSW 90 weeks after the MMI date of 10.1.13.; i.e., on or about 5.23.15. The 
Claimant also requests an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 because the 
ISIP has contested the Claimant's right to receive his full statutory TPD benefits without 
reasonable grounds. 
The Employer did not respond to the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code 
§72-711 arguments in its written response. The Employer's silence must mean that the 
Employer realizes that that the Industrial Commission has no choice but to declare the PPI credit 
provisions of the Compensation Agreement and Order of Approval and Discharge void because 
they relieve the Employer of its obligation to pay full statutory TPD benefits in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 72-408 and Idaho Code §72-318(1) and require the Claimant to waive his right to 
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receive the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-408 
and Idaho Code §72-318(2). 
Since the terms of the invalid PPI credit granted to Employer did not conform to the 
provisions of the Act, the Commission did not have authority to approve the PPI credit and it 
must be declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 and Idaho Code §72-318. 
Like the ISIP, the Employer did not even address the Claimant's request for attorney's 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. Implicit in the Employer's silence is the recognition that it 
has contested the Claimant's right to receive the full measure of his statutory TPD benefits under 
Idaho Code §72-408 without reasonable grounds. The Commission should declare that portion of 
the Compensation Agreement which awards an invalid PPI credit to Employer void and award 
attorneys' fees to the Claimant because Employer has contested his right to receive the full 
measure of his TPD benefits without reasonable grounds. 
Time is of the essence in this matter because the Employer will stop paying the Claimant 
55% of the 2004 AWSW 90 weeks after the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13; i.e., on or about 
5 .23 .15. The Claimant respectfully requests that the Commission issue the requested Declaratory 
Rulings in this case as soon as possible. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of March 2015. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By:£~~ 
RICKD. KALLAS 
Attorney for Claimant 
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Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of March 2015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Claimant's Rely Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
by the method indicated below upon the following persons: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam &Burke 
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
[ X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ J Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.384.5844 
-Q~~ 
Rick D. Kalla~ 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
v. 
Claimant, 
Petitioner herein, 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Respondents herein. 
IC 15-000107 
(2005-501080) 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
DECLARATORY RULING 
FILED 
-6 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On February 26, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition for declaratory ruling with supporting 
memorandum. Petitioner requests a ruling on the impact of Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 
157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) on the parties' lump sum settlement agreement (LSSA), 
approved by order of the Commission dated June 26, 2014. Petitioner argues that Corgatelli, 
supra, renders the PPI credit in the LSSA invalid, and without Commission intervention, 
the present LSSA improperly denies Petitioner the full measure of his statutory total permanent 
disability benefits, unfairly relieves Employer/Surety (Employer) and the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund (ISIF) of their respective obligations to pay Petitioner total permanent disability 
benefits, unfairly requires Petitioner to waive his full statutory total permanent disability 
benefits, and adversely affects the timing of ISIF' s total permanent disability payments. 
Petitioner also wishes the Commission to evaluate the LSSA for ambiguity, and to order the 
payment of attorney's fees by Employer and ISIF because they have contested Petitioner's 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1 
99 
request for the "full measure" of his TPD benefits. 
On March 11, 2015, Employer filed an objection to Petitioner's request. Employer 
argues that Petitioner's proposed issues are not proper for a declaratory ruling, because 
Petitioner's petition is an attempt to retroactively apply Corgatelli, supra, to the June 26, 2014 
LSSA, which was dismissed with prejudice. Employer argues that the reconsideration and 
appeal time has passed, thus the LSSA is final and no actual controversy exists. Employer also 
challenges Petitioner's service of the petition for declaratory ruling. 
On March 12, 2015, ISIP filed a limited appearance to challenge the subject matter 
jurisdiction and service of process. 
On March 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a reply brief. Petitioner objects to the ISIF's 
arglli?ents, and contends that the Commission has jurisdiction to consider his petition for 
declaratory ruling. 
Petitioner Properly Served Respondents 
ISIF and Employer argue that Petitioner improperly served them because their respective 
legal counsel no longer represented them after the negotiated LSSA. However, neither counsel 
for the ISIF nor Employer complied with Commission rules treating the withdrawal as counsel of 
record under J.R.P. 14. The Commission finds that Petitioner properly served his request for 
declaratory ruling. 
The Impact of Corgatelli on the Previously Approved LSSA 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law 
(JRP) 15(c) (May 8, 2013) describes by whom, and for what, a petition for declaratory ruling 
may be filed: 
J.R.P. lS(c). Contents of Petition. 
Whenever any person has an actual controversy over the construction, validity or 
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applicability of a statute, rule, or order, that person may file a written petition with 
the Commission, subject to the following requirements: 
1. The petitioner must expressly seek a declaratory ruling and must identify 
the statute, rule, or order on which a ruling is requested and state the issue 
or issues to be decided; 
2. The petitioner must allege that an actual controversy exists over the 
construction, validity or applicability of the statute, rule, or order and must 
state with specificity the nature of the controversy; 
3. The petitioner must have an interest which is directly affected by the 
statute, rule, or order in which a ruling is requested and must plainly state 
that interest in the petition; and 
4. The petition shall be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth all 
relevant facts and law in support thereof. 
The Commission may decline to make a ruling where it lacks jurisdiction over the issue 
presented or where there is other good cause why a ruling should not be made. J.R.P.15(f). 
Here, it is clear that Petitioner qualifies as a "person" as defined in the rule. Petitioner 
alleges the existence of an "actual controversy" over the validity of an Order of the Commission, 
i.e., the LSSA approved by order of the Commission dated June 26, 2014. Petitioner contends 
that in view of Corgatelli, supra, the "credit" given in the LSSA for the payment of a prior 
impairment rating is illegal. Employer and the ISIP assert that the LSSA is legal, binding, 
and not subject to further review by the Commission. Assuming that the Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction over the LSSA, an "actual controversy" between Petitioner and the other 
parties to the LSSA appears to exist since Petitioner may net a larger recovery depending on 
how the controversy is resolved. 
The LSSA at issue in this matter was approved by the Commission on June 26, 2014 
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-404, which provides: 
Whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest of all parties, 
the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the 
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the 
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payment of one or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the 
comm1ss10n. 
Idaho Code § 72-404. 
LSSAs are agreements of both compromise and commutation. The LSSA approved by the 
Commission contains both of these elements. The LSSA reflects that Petitioner suffered the 
subject work accident on November 9, 2004. This accident caused injury to Petitioner's lumbar 
spine. Petitioner suffered from a number of pre-existing conditions involving his lumbar and 
cervical spine. In fact, prior to November 9, 2004, Petitioner had undergone four lumbar spine 
surgeries. Following the November 9, 2004 accident, Petitioner underwent five additional 
lumbar spine surgeries and two cervical spine surgeries. The parties agree that the subject 
accident caused further injury to Petitioner's lumbar spine and that Petitioner is totally and 
permanently disabled, with a date of medical stability of October 1, 2013. 
The parties also stipulated and agreed that all elements of ISIP liability are satisfied, 
and that responsibility for Petitioner's total and permanent disability should be apportioned 
between Employer and the ISIP. The manner in which that disability should be apportioned 
between Employer and the ISIP is the principle dispute resolved by the LSSA. 
The LSSA reflects that there was disagreement between the parties over the extent 
and degree of Petitioner's accident-produced impairment, two physicians proposing that this 
impairment equaled 100%, while two other physicians proposed that Petitioner's accident-
produced impairment equaled 22%. For the purposes of the LSSA, the parties stipulated that 
Petitioner's pre-existing permanent physical impairment equaled 32% of the whole person, 
while his accident-produced impairment equaled 27% of the whole person. The parties agreed 
that Petitioner's total and permanent disability would be shared by the Employer and the ISIF 
using these agreed upon PPI ratings to apportion Petitioner's remaining disability "according to 
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law," i.e., per Carey v. Clearwater Cnty Road Dept. 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984). 
Therefore, with these assumptions in place, the parties agreed that Employer would accept 
responsibility for the payment of 250 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits commencing 
October 1, 2013. During this 250 week period, the ISIF agreed to pay Petitioner additional 
benefits to bring Petitioner's weekly benefit up to the amount he is entitled to as a totally 
and permanently disabled employee. Thereafter, the ISIF would be solely responsible for the 
payment of total and permanent disability benefits until Petitioner's death. 
Paragraph 12 of the LSSA reflects that prior to the execution of that document, Employer 
paid the entire 27% PPI rating ($39,649.50) which the parties agreed was owed by Employer. In 
addition, Employer had paid Petitioner an amount equal to 5% of the whole person as an advance 
against permanent disability. These benefits totaled 32% or 160 weeks of PPD, $46,992.00 at 
the appropriate rate. The LSSA reflects that Employer is entitled to apply these payments as a 
credit against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of benefits from October 1, 2013 forward. 
It is Petitioner's central contention that per Corgatelli, the credit allowed by the LSSA 
for the previously paid 27% PPI rating ($39,649.50) is illegal, and that Employer must pay the 
full 250 weeks contemplated by the calculation set forth in Carey v. Clearwater Cnty Road 
Dep't, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984). 
It is worth reviewing Carey, supra, in connection with Petitioner's assertions about the 
application of Corgatelli, supra, to this matter. 
In Carey, the claimant was found to have permanent physical impairment of 10% relating 
to a pre-existing condition and 40% relating to the work accident, for a total of 50%. Carey was 
found to be totally and permanently disabled under the odd lot doctrine, and the question before 
the Court was how to apportion the 50% disability from nonmedical factors (100% minus 50% 
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PPI = 50% disability from nonmedical factors) between the employer and the ISIP. Noting that 
the Commission had applied different rules to apportion liability between employer and ISIP in 
several cases then before the Court, the Court announced a rule of general application to address 
how disability from nonmedical factors should be apportioned where the ISIP shares 
responsibility with employer for claimant's total and permanent disability. The Court stated: 
We believe that the appropriate solution to the problem of apportioning the 
nonmedical disability factors, in an odd-lot case where the fund is involved, is to 
prorate the nonmedical portion of disability between the employer and the fund, 
in proportion to their respective percentages of responsibility for the physical 
impairment. Thus, in the instant case, Mr. Carey's preexisting impairment was 
10% of the whole man, and his physical impairment from the accident is an 
additional 40%, resulting in a 50% impairment. Claimant is 100% disabled, by 
virtue of the odd-lot doctrine, so an additional 50% nonmedical factors, over and 
above the 50% physical impairment, need to be allocated between the 
employer/surety and the fund. The fund is therefore responsible for 10/50, or 4/5 
(80%) [sic], of the nonmedical portion of disability, and the employer is liable for 
40/50, or 4/5 (80%), of the nonmedical factors. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, in addition to the responsibility that employer and ISIP each bear for PPI, they also bear 
responsibility for disability from nonmedical factors in the same proportion that they share 
responsibility for PPL Therefore, in Carey, employer was responsible for 40/50 of the claimant's 
disability from nonmedical factors, or 40% over and above the PPI for which it was responsible 
(40/50 x 50% = 40%). Employer's total responsibility under Carey was 80% (40% disability for 
nonmedical factors + 40% PPI). This rating was payable at 55% of the average state weekly 
wage for the year of injury. The claimant was entitled to recover from the ISIP the difference 
between the permanent partial disability compensation paid by the employer and the total and 
permanent disability benefits to which he was found to be entitled as an odd lot worker. 
The facts of Carey bear a certain similarity to those before the Commission in the instant 
matter. Here, the parties stipulated that Petitioner's pre-existing PPI was 32%, while his accident 
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produced impairment was 27%. These impairments total 59% of the whole person, leaving 
41 % disability over and above impairment to apportion between the Employer and the ISIP in 
the same proportion that each entity bears responsibility for Petitioner's total PPI of 59%. 
Employer's responsibility for disability over and above Petitioner's PPI is calculated as follows: 
27/59 x 41 = 18.76%. Therefore, the total responsibility of Employer for the payment of 
disability, inclusive of impairment, is 45.76% (27% PPI + 18.76% disability from nonmedical 
factors). 45.76% disability equates to 228.80 weeks of disability paid at 55% of the average state 
weekly wage for the year of injury. 1 The responsibility of Employer to pay these benefits 
commences, per the LSSA, on October 1, 2013. Petitioner is entitled to recover from the ISIP 
the difference between the permanent partial disability compensation paid by Employer and the 
total and permanent disability benefits to which Petitioner is entitled by virtue of his total and 
permanent disability. 
Of course, prior to the LSSA, Employer discharged its obligation to pay the 27% PPI 
rating, possibly concluding that it had no defense to the payment of the same once Petitioner had 
been pronounced stable and ratable. Petitioner contends that the fact that this payment was made 
is in no wise relevant to the obligation of Employer to make this payment again as part of its 
responsibility under Carey, notwithstanding, as developed above, that a careful reading of Carey 
actually seems to endorse the notion that Employer should not have to pay the same impairment 
twice. Petitioner relies on the recent case of Corgatelli in support of his position. 
In Corgatelli, the Commission found claimant to be totally and permanent disabled, and 
determined that liability should be shared by employer and the ISIP. Corgatelli was found to 
1 Although the Carey calculation actually yields Employer responsibility for the payment of 228.80 weeks of 
benefits, the parties agreed, for whatever reason, that the Carey calculation yields Employer responsibility for the 
payment of250 weeks of benefits. (See paragraph 10 of the LSS.) 
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have impairment totaling 15% of the whole person, with 5% attributable to a pre-existing 
condition and I 0% attributable to the subject accident. This left 85% disability from nonmedical 
factors to be apportioned between the ISIP and the employer. Applying the Carey formula, the 
Commission found that employer's liability for disability from nonmedical factors was 56.7% 
(10/15 x 85). To this, the Commission added employer's responsibility for PPI, and found that 
the total responsibility of employer was 66.7% (56.7 + 10). 66.7% disability equates to 333.5 
weeks of benefits commencing as of the date of Corgatelli's medical stability. 
Employer filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking a ruling from the Commission that 
in discharging its obligation to pay disability benefits in the amount of 66. 7% of the whole 
person, it was allowed to take a credit for the I 0% PPI rating already paid to Corgatelli. The 
Commission reasoned that to deny employer's request would be to essentially require employer 
to pay the PPI award twice. Therefore, employer's motion was granted. Employer was 
obligated to pay the 66. 7% disability award but received a credit in the amount of the PPI award 
already paid. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court first addressed the Commission's decision to 
credit employer's finite responsibility to pay a 66.7% disability award with the PPI payments it 
had previously made. The Court stated that PPI and PPD are different creatures entirely, and that 
there is no statutory authority that authorizes the Commission to apply the payment of PPI 
benefits as a credit against an employer's obligation to pay total and permanent disability 
benefits. 
As applied to the facts of the instant matter, application of this rule means that against 
their obligation to pay disability of 45.76% (which consists of PPI of 27% and disability from 
nonmedical factors of 18. 76%) Employer will not be allowed a credit for the 27% PPI previously 
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paid. While we agree that the holding of Corgatelli appears to endorse double payment of PPI, 
and therefore a double recovery to Petitioner, we are constrained by what seems to be the 
unambiguous rule of that case. Therefore, were this case before us following a hearing which 
adduced facts like those recited in the approved LSSA, we would likely be required to conclude 
that Employer is not entitled to a credit for the previously-paid PPI, and must pay the full 
45.76% disability rating, notwithstanding that that rating is a composite of the previously paid 
PPI and disability from nonmedical factors owed under Carey. 
Of course, this case did not go to hearing, but was resolved by the Commission's 
approval of a LSSA proposed and executed by the parties. In cases involving the ISIP, the 
Commission is cognizant of its heightened responsibility to be satisfied that such proposed 
agreements meet the standards imposed by Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 
147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). As respects settlements with the ISIP, the Court 
unambiguously concluded that the Industrial Commission does not even have jurisdiction to 
consider such a LSSA without first being satisfied that all elements of ISIP liability are met. 
Only then does the Commission have jurisdiction to consider whether the proposed LSSA is in 
the best interests of the parties under Idaho Code § 72-404. Essentially, the Commission must 
ascertain why it makes sense for a claimant to accept a lump sum payment from the ISIF when, 
absent settlement, a claimant would receive total and permanent disability payments for life. 
Here, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner is totally and permanently disabled, and 
the LSSA so reflects. Moreover, the LSSA reflects that the statutory elements of ISIP liability 
are satisfied. In his petition, Petitioner does not challenge that part of the LSSA which finds 
Petitioner to be totally and permanently disabled, and the elements of ISIP liability satisfied. 
Rather, the focus is on the credit taken, and whether this is in conflict with Corgatelli. 
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It is axiomatic that an order approving a LSSA is a "decision" of the Commission 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718. (Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154 Idaho 633, 637, 301 
P.3d 639, 643 (2013), citing Davidson v. HH Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 760, 718 P.2d 1196, 
1198 (1986)). In addition to approving the LSSA, the June 26, 2014 Order of the Commission 
dismissed Petitioner's complaint with prejudice. Under Idaho Code § 72-718, Petitioner had 20 
days after June 26, 2014 within which to file with the Commission his motion for reconsideration 
of the Commission's approval of the LSSA. This, he failed to do, and no appeal of the order 
approving the LSSA was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, this "decision" of the 
Commission is final. 
Idaho Code § 72-719 specifies that within five years following the date of injury, 
an injured worker may petition the Commission for a modification of an award to address 
a change of condition, fraud, or to correct a "manifest injustice". Significantly, the provisions 
ofldaho Code § 72-719 do not apply to a LSSA approved by the Commission pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 72-404. See Idaho Code 72-719(4). Therefore, neither does Idaho Code§ 72-719 
afford Petitioner a path forward on attacking the approved LSSA. 
Idaho Code§ 72-318, discussed at some length in Wernecke, supra, provides: 
(1) No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the premiums paid by his 
employer for workmen's compensation, or to contribute to the cost or other 
security maintained for or carried for the purpose of securing the payment of 
workmen's compensation, or to contribute to a benefit fund or department 
maintained by the employer, or any contract, rule, regulation or device whatever 
designed to relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability created by 
this law, shall be valid. Any employer who makes a deduction for such purpose 
from the remuneration of any employee entitled to the benefits of this act shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this 
act shall be valid. 
The Wernecke Court recognized that generally speaking, the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-318 
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prohibit the agreement by an employee to give up his right to pursue workers' compensation 
benefits for claims that have not yet arisen. Much of the discussion of this statute in Wernecke 
centered around a narrow exception to this general rule which allows the ISIP to enter into 
LSSAs under the terms of which the injured worker waives his right to future compensation. 
However, citing to Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005), the Wernecke 
Court made it clear that LSSAs which resolve claims for a past injury are not void under 
Idaho Code § 72-318. 
Therefore, Idaho Code § 72-318 does not authorize Petitioner's attack on the LSSA. 
First, vis-a-vis the LSSA with the ISIP, this LSSA is one of the narrow variety of LSSAs 
which can legally resolve claims for future injuries. Second, vis-a-vis the Employer, this LSSA 
is one which resolves a past injury, a type of LSSA altogether appropriate under Idaho Code 
§ 72-318. Accordingly, the doctrines of quasi-estoppel and res judicata, which were found 
inapplicable in Wernecke because the prior LSSA was void under Idaho Code § 72-318, do have 
application here. We conclude that neither Wernecke nor the provisions ofldaho Code § 72-318 
provide any basis to attack the approved LSSA. 
Of course, it was but a scant few days following the Commission's approval of the 
subject LSSA that the Court issued its opinion in Corgatelli, supra, and it must be acknowledged 
that had the parties been pre-aware of the holding in that case, the LSSA would look different 
than the one approved by the Commission. It may have provided for additional payments, it may 
have provided for the same payments but couched in different language, or the parties might 
never have reached any agreement. 
Suffice it to say, however, that we can think of no mechanism by which the approved 
LSSA may be attacked at this remove. The Industrial Commission lacks subject matter 
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jurisdiction to entertain revision of the LSSA approved by final decision of the Commission. 
Even if such a request could be entertained, we conclude that there is yet no way to retroactively 
apply the rule of Corgatelli to past LSSAs and past decisions of the Commission. The 
Commission would do little else but revisit many thousands of long-resolved claims were that 
the case. 
ISIF's Obligation to Pay Benefits 
Petitioner's second principle contention is that if Employer is entitled to a "credit" for 
past PPI paid, the LSSA approved by the Industrial Commission is ambiguous in defining the 
date on which the ISIF becomes solely responsible for paying Petitioner's entitlement to 
statutory benefits for total and permanent disability. Petitioner asks the Commission to resolve 
the ambiguity by construing the LSSA to require that the ISIF's exclusive responsibility to pay 
statutory benefits shall commence at the expiration of 90 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013, 
as opposed to the expiration of 250 weeks subsequent to that date. 
We find that the LSSA is not ambiguous, and that the responsibility of the ISIF to assume 
exclusive responsibility for the payment of statutory benefits for total and permanent disability 
does not begin until after the expiration of250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013. 
As reflected in paragraph 11 of the LSSA, the parties agreed on a scheme by which 
responsibility for the payment of statutory total and permanent disability benefits would be 
apportioned between the employer and the ISIF. Per the LSSA, the Employer and the ISIF share 
responsibility for the payment of statutory benefits for 250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013, 
with the ISIP assuming sole responsibility for the payment of benefits at the end of that 
250 week period. However, paragraph 11 also specifies that Employer's obligation to pay 
benefits during the 250 week period subsequent to October 1, 2013 is subject to the "credit" 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 12 
110 
for the previous payment of a 27% PPI rating and a 5% advance on disability, equating to 
160 weeks of benefits. The argument is that the application of this credit results in the 
acceleration of the date on which the ISIF becomes solely responsible for the payment of 
benefits. Application of the credit means that the ISIF assumes sole responsibility for the 
payment of statutory benefits at the expiration of 90 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013 
(250 weeks minus 160 weeks). 
We do not believe the LSSA contemplates the outcome suggested by Petitioner. 
Paragraph 11 of the LSSA clearly contemplates that despite whatever credit may be taken by 
the Employer, ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of Petitioner's statutory benefits does not 
commence until the expiration of250 weeks subsequent to October 1, 2013. 
Petitioner argues that to do other than as he suggests will leave him with a benefit gap 
between October 1, 2013, and the expiration of the 250 week period referenced in the LSSA. 
Therefore, the argument goes, unless ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of Petitioner's statutory 
benefit is pushed back to 90 weeks following October 1, 2013, the application of the credit will 
leave Petitioner without full payment of his statutory entitlement for a period of approximately 
160 weeks. However, this argument fails to recognize that Petitioner has been paid for this 160 
week period, and presumably received that payment during the 160 week period, i.e., subsequent 
to the October 1, 2013 date of medical stability. We find no basis to support the assertion that 
Petitioner will somehow be shortchanged where ISIF's sole responsibility for the payment of 
Petitioner's total and permanent disability benefits does not begin until the expiration of the 250 
week period following October 1, 2013. 
Attorney Fees 
Petitioner requests Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney's fees against Employer and ISIF 
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for their refusal to declare the PPI credit void, and ISIF's refusal to pay TPD benefits 90 weeks 
after the October 1, 2013 date of MMI. Petitioner has failed to persuade the Commission that 
attorney's fees are appropriate. 
ORDER 
For these reasons, we decline to accept Petitioner's invitation to revisit the provisions of 
the LSSA approved by the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2014. 
DATED this t..,-t h dayof f)~ ,2015. 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner/ Claimant, Gary Davis, and pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
718 and J.R.P. 3(G), hereby moves the Industrial Commission for an Order which reconsiders 
the Industrial Commission's October 6, 2015 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling on the 
grounds and for the reasons that: 
1. The industrial commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction and entered an invalid 
order when it granted employer / surety an unauthorized credit for the payment of PPI 
benefits in direct violation ofldaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409; 
2. The Industrial Commission did not fulfill its obligation to set aside its invalid June 
26, 2014 Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(1), Idaho Code §72-318(2) and 
Idaho Code §72-711; and, 
3. The phrase "subject to the credit" is ambiguous because it leads to completely 
different outcomes when inconsistently applied to each defendant and deprives the 
claimant of the full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits. 
This Motion For Reconsideration is based on the provisions of the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act, the JRP and the points and authorities set forth in the Petitioner's Brief in 
Support of Motion For Reconsideration. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of October 2015. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
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(1) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LIMITED filRISDICTION AND 
ENTERED AN INVALID ORDER WHEN IT GRANTED EMPLOYER/ SURETY AN 
UNAUTHORIZED CREDIT FOR THE PAYMENT OF PPI BENEFITS IN DIRECT 
VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE §72-408 AND IDAHO CODE §72-409 
The Industrial Commission only has limited jurisdiction as defined by the provisions of 
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act: 
The Commission has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has 
specifically granted to it. The Commission therefore exercises limited jurisdiction, 
with nothing being presumed in favor of its jurisdiction. See Idaho Power Co. v. 
Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639 P.2d 442, 448 (1981) 
(jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission limited). Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 
686, 690, 864 P. 132, 136 (1993). 
When the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order approvmg the parties' 
Compensation Agreement, there was absolutely no provision in the entire worker's 
compensation act which gave the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to give Employer / Surety a 
credit for PPI benefits previously paid toward its obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure 
of his total and permanent disability benefits required by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code 
§72-409: 
Examining worker's compensation law as a whole, Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141 
Idaho 524, 528, 112 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), this Court finds that there is no 
statutory basis for the Commission to award Steel West a credit for permanent 
physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli . ... 
Thus, the current version of Idaho Code section 72-408, which provides for the 
employee such as Corgatelli to receive total and permanent disability benefits, 
includes no deduction or credit for previously paid permanent impairment benefits 
in its award of disability benefits .... 
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the employer to 
receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits paid before the award 
of total and permanent disability benefits. As a purely statutory scheme, the Court 
cannot judicially construct a credit for employers into worker's compensation law. 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014). 
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The Defendants in the Corgatelli case were the Idaho State Insurance Fund and the 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. The Idaho Supreme Court published its Corgatelli decision 
on 8.25.14- just 60 days after the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order approving the 
Compensation Agreement in this case. What is interesting about this time line is that when the 
State Insurance Fund and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund signed the Stipulation For Entry 
of Award Against the Defendants (Compensation Agreement) in this case, they knew that 
Claimant in Corgatelli had already appealed the Industrial Commission's grant of a PPI credit to 
the Employer in Corgatelli to the Idaho Supreme Court and that an adverse decision from the 
Supreme Court could be entered at any moment. 
Even though the State Insurance Fund and the ISIF both knew that the PPI credit issue 
was on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in Corgatelli while the stipulation in this case was 
being drafted by the Defendants, neither Defendant felt the need to disclose that fact to the 
Claimant in this case before he executed the stipulation. Of course, if the Claimant had known 
that both Defendants were parties to a case on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court which 
addressed the PPI credit issue, the Claimant never would have agreed to the credit language set 
forth in paragraph 12 of the stipulation in this case. 
Even if the Idaho Supreme Court had never published the Corgatelli decision, the 
Industrial Commission cannot escape the fact that on the date it approved the Compensation 
Agreement in this case on 6.26.14, there was absolutely no provision in the entire Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Act which gave the Industrial Commission the jurisdiction to grant 
Employer I Surety a credit for PPI benefits previously paid and then subtract that credit from the 
Employer's obligation to pay the Claimant the full measure of his total and permanent disability 
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benefits required by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409. 
Based on nothing but a pure statutory analysis and without even considering the Court's 
holding in Corgatelli, the Compensation Agreement approved by the Commission on 6.26.14 
must be treated as an invalid agreement under Idaho Code §72-318(1) because it "relieve[s] the 
employer in whole or in part" of the Employer's liability to pay the Claimant the full measure of 
his total and permanent disability benefits as required by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code 
§72-409. The Commission cannot judicially construct or approve a credit for Employer that the 
statute does not provide. The Compensation Agreement is also invalid under Idaho Code §72-
318(2) because it requires the Claimant to waive his rights to receive the full measure of his total 
and permanent disability benefits under Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409. 
When the Commission ruled on the Petitioner's Petition For Declaratory Ruling, the 
Commission dismissed Petitioner's Idaho Code § 72-318 arguments by giving an extremely 
narrow and overly technical interpretation to the Supreme Court's holding in Wernecke v. St. 
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). According to the 
Industrial Commission's interpretation of Wernecke, Idaho Code §72-318 can only be applied in 
those limited situations where the Claimant has entered into an agreement that purports to waive 
claims for future injuries. The Wernecke Court expressly rejected this type of overly narrow and 
hyper-technical interpretation of the Act: 
When interpreting the Act, we must liberally construe its provisions in favor of 
the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated. 
Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005); Davaz v. 
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). The Act 
is designed to provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families 
and dependents. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296; LC. § 72-201. The 
primary objective of an award of permanent disability benefits is to compensate 
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the claimant for his or her loss of earning capacity. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 
P.2d at 1296. The purposes served by the Act leave no room for narrow technical 
constructions. Reese, 141 Idaho at 633, 115 P.3d at 724. Wernecke v. St. Maries 
Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,282,207 P.3d 1008, 1113 (2009). 
The Supreme Court has not given Wernecke the overly narrow interpretation applied by 
the Industrial Commission and limited the application ofldaho Code §72-318 only to agreements 
which waive future claims. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has recently held that Idaho 
Code §72-318 can be used to declare any agreement void if that agreement violates any 
provision of the workers' compensation Act: 
This Court has set aside a lump sum agreement on grounds of illegality but in that 
case the agreement was violative of the provisions of a workers' compensation 
statute. See Wernecke, 147 Idaho at 286, 207 P.3d at 1017 (the Commission " 
erred by approving an agreement" that purported to waive an employee's right to 
compensation for future injuries because the Commission failed to make findings 
required by LC. § 72-332). However, Morris does not contend that the LSSA 
violates the provisions of any statute and has not shown that it is afflicted by any 
other illegality. Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154 Idaho 633, 301 P. 3d 639, 
643 (2013) (italics supplied). 
If the Claimant in Morris had alleged that the LSSA had violated any provisions of the 
Idaho workers' compensation Act or was illegal for some other reason, the Court would have 
properly applied Idaho Code §72-318 and set aside the illegal agreement. The Claimant in this 
case has specifically alleged that certain provisions of the Compensation Agreement violate the 
Act because they give Employer / Surety an illegal credit for the payment of PPI benefits that 
reduces their obligation to pay Claimant the full measure of his total and permanent disability 
benefits as required by Idaho Code §72-408, Idaho Code §72-409 and the formula announced by 
the Supreme Court in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 
54 (1984). 
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The plain language of Idaho Code §72-318 states that any agreement which relieves an 
Employer of its obligation to pay the full measure of benefits due or forces the Claimant to waive 
his right to receive the full measure of benefits is invalid. The Industrial Commission should 
grant the Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration based on the plain language of Idaho Code 
§72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 which do not give the Commission the jurisdiction to grant the 
Employer any credit for PPI benefits previously paid. 
The Industrial Commission stated in its 10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider revising the illegal provisions in the 
Compensation Agreement that were approved by the Commission in its 6.26.14 Order (See pp. 
11-12 of 10.6.15 Order). However, the Industrial Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court 
always have subject matter jurisdiction to set aside an illegal or invalid agreement: 
The parties did not argue the illegality of the agreement until this appeal. The 
illegality of a contract, however, can be raised at any stage in litigation. The Court 
has the duty to raise the issue of iIIegality sua sponte. Morrison v. Young, 136 
Idaho 316, 318, 32 P.3d 1116, 1118 (2001); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 
566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997). Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law 
for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Morrison, 136 Idaho at 318, 32 P.3d at lll8; Quiring, 130 Idaho at 566,944 P.2d 
at 701 (citing Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,283,240 P.2d 833,840 (1952)). 
An iIIegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act 
or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 
566, 944 P.2d at 701 (citations omitted). The general rule is that a contract 
prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable. Id.; Williams v. Cont'! Life & Acc. 
Co., 100 Idaho 71, 73,593 P.2d 708, 710 (1979); Whitney v. Cont'! Life and Acc. 
Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105,403 P.2d 573,579 (1965). A contract "which is made for 
the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void." 
Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 6ll, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222 
(Ct.App.1999) (quoting Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 
Idaho 522,525,263 P. 632,633 (1928)). This rule applies on the ground of public 
policy to every contract which is founded on a transaction prohibited by statute. 
Id. (citing Porter, 45 Idaho at 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928) (citations omitted)). 
Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765,768 (2002). 
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The Industrial Commission should grant the Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration 
because the Industrial Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction when it gave Employer / 
Surety an illegal credit for the payment of PPI benefits when Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho 
Code §72-409 did not authorize such a credit on the date when the Industrial Commission 
approved the Compensation Agreement on 6.26.14. 
(2) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED THE LIMITED filRISDICTION 
GRANTED TO IT UNDER IDAHO CODE §72-711 WHEN IT APPROVED A 
STIPULATON I AGREEMENT THAT VIOLATED IDAHO CODE §72-408 AND 
IDAHO CODE §72-409 
When the parties to a worker's compensation claim enter into an agreement to resolve the 
Defendants' liability for the payment of total and permanent disability benefits, there are 2 legal 
mechanisms that may be used: (1) A compensation agreement which defines the Defendants' 
obligations to make periodic payments to the Claimant pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and 
Idaho Code §72-409 which is subject to the approval of the Commission pursuant to Idaho Code 
§72-711; or (2) a lump sum settlement agreement which commutes the periodic payments that 
would otherwise be due under I.C. §72-408 and LC. §72-409 into a lump sum and which is 
approved by the Industrial Commission pursuant to Idaho Code §72-404: 
Once a determination is made regarding the degree of a claimant's permanent 
disability, compensation for that disability may be awarded either through 
periodic payments, LC. §§ 72-408, -409, or through a single lump sum payment, 
I.C. § 72-404. The particular method of compensation is left largely to the 
discretion of the parties, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, LC. 
§§ 72-404, 72-711. Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 291, 293, 732 
P.2d 260,262 (1986). 
In his Petition For Declaratory Ruling, the Claimant alleged that the stipulation / 
agreement for periodic payments at issue in this case was a Compensation Agreement that must 
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be set aside under Idaho Code §72-711 because its provisions did not conform to the provisions 
ofldaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409: 
72-711. COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS. If the employer and the afflicted 
employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a 
memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the commission, and, if 
approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be an award by 
the commission and be enforceable under the provisions of section 72-735, unless 
modified as provided in section 72-719. An agreement shall be approved by the 
commission only when the terms conform to the provisions of this law (italics 
supplied). 
Rather than address the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-711 Compensation Agreement 
arguments in its 10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling, the Industrial Commission 
mischaracterized the periodic payment agreement entered into by the parties as a Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement (LSSA) and ignored the requirement of Idaho Code §72-711 that all 
agreements involving periodic payments must "conform to the provisions of this law". 
The LSSA at issue in this matter was approved by the Commission on June 26, 
2014 pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-404, which provides: ... 
LSSAs arc agreements of both compromise and commutation. The LSSA 
approved by The Commission contains both of these elements. (See pp. 3-4 of 
10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling). 
A careful reading of the "Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants" that was 
approved by the Commission in its 6.26.14 Order confirms that the agreement did not require 
Employer I Surety or the ISIF to pay the Claimant a lump sum. On the contrary, the agreement 
required the Defendants to make periodic monthly payments of total and permanent disability 
benefits to the Claimant at the statutory rate of 45% of the AWSW beginning on 10.1.13 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 and the Carey formula. There is 
absolutely no textual basis in the body of the stipulation / agreement to support the 
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Commission's mischaracterization of the agreement as a LSSA that would be subject to approval 
under Idaho Code §72-404. 
The express purpose of the agreement was to provide the Claimant with the full measure 
all benefits that he would be entitled to under the Act including, but not limited to, "total and 
permanent disability income benefits pursuant to law": 
The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for 
and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be 
entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found 
to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for 
permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability 
income benefits pursuant to law. (See ,r20 of the stipulation approved by the 
Commission in its 6.26.14 Order) (italics supplied). 
The provisions of the Act which obligate Employer / Surety and the ISIF to provide the 
Claimant with the full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits are Idaho Code §72-
408 and Idaho Code §72-409. At the time when the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14 
Order approving the compensation agreement of the parties, those code provision did not give 
the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to grant Employer / Surety an illegal credit for PPI 
benefits previously paid by Employer / Surety. Therefore, the Industrial Commission acted 
beyond the scope of its limited jurisdiction when it approved the illegal credit and the 
Commission must set aside those provisions of the agreement which "do not conform to the 
provisions of this law": 
An agreement shall be approved by the commission only when the terms conform 
to the provisions of this law. See Idaho Code §72-711 (italics supplied). 
Since the stipulation/ agreement did not conform to the provisions of Idaho Code §72-
408 and Idaho Code §72-409, the Commission did not have jurisdiction to approve the illegal 
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PPI credit that was granted to Employer / Surety and should enter an Order On Reconsideration 
which declares the illegal PPI credit void and unenforceable. 
(3) THE PHRASE SUBJECT TO THE CREDIT IS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT LEADS 
TO COMPLETELY DIFFERENT OUTCOMES WHEN APPLIED TO EACH 
DEFENDANT AND DEPRIVES THE CLAIMANT OF THE FULL MEASURE OF 
HIS TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS 
The stated purpose of the Compensation Agreement approved by the Commission on 
6.26.14 was to provide the Claimant with the full measure of his statutory total and permanent 
disability benefits beginning on IO .1.13 and continuing each month thereafter for the rest of his 
life based on the statutory rate of 45% of the AWSW: 
Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is entitled to be paid total and pennanent 
disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average weekly state wage 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409 (See !11 of stipulation). 
The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for 
and to be paid hereunder are the fall measure of benefits Claimant would be 
entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found 
to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for 
permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability 
income benefits pursuant to law. (See 120 of the stipulation approved by the 
Commission in its 6.26.14 Order) (italics supplied). 
The fundamental payment obligations of the agreement are not ambiguous. Beginning on 
10.1.13, the Claimant is entitled to receive the full measure of his statutory total and permanent 
disability benefits each month for the rest of his life at 45% of the A WSW pursuant to Idaho 
Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409. 
The ambiguity which is at the crux of this matter is only created when the Defendants and 
the Commission inconsistently apply the phrase "subject to the credit described in paragraph 12, 
below" to Defendant Employer and to Defendant ISIF's obligation to pay total and permanent 
disability benefits. 
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According to the Defendants and the Commission, when the phrase "subject to the credit" 
set forth in paragraph 11 is applied to the Employer, it means that the Employer's obligation to 
pay the Claimant total and permanent disability benefits terminates 90 weeks after 10 .1.13. 
However, when the identical phrase in paragraph 11 is applied to the ISIF, it means that the 
ISIF's obligation to begin paying the Claimant the full measure of his total and permanent 
disability benefits does not begin until 250 weeks after 10.1.13. These inconsistent outcomes 
could not be achieved if the subject phrase were not ambiguous; i.e., the identical phrase means 2 
different things when applied to 2 different Defendants. 
When the inconsistent application of the same exact phrase leads to 2 completely 
different outcomes when applied to different Defendants and those different outcomes deprive 
the Claimant of the full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits for a period of 160 
weeks from week 90 to week 250, then it should be obvious that the phrase is ambiguous. The 
question of whether a compensation agreement is ambiguous is a question of law. 
The 1976 compensation agreement, however, is a Woodvine type "and/or" 
agreement which, in the Woodvine case, we held could be construed to be 
ambiguous. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 
(1984). While "[d]etermination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a 
question of law," Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 
(1986), "[i]nterpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact." 
Id. Accord Woodvine. Thus, the interpretation of the 1976 compensation 
agreement was a question of fact which, if raised, should have been decided by 
the Commission. Since it is arguable that the ambiguity issue was reserved as a 
result of the stipulation of the parties, we remand the matter to the Commission to 
resolve the ambiguity question involved in the 1976 agreement. Fowler v. City of 
Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 6, 773 P.2d 269,274 (1988). 
The Industrial Commission has resolved this question of law by concluding that the 
phrase "subject to the credit" is not ambiguous: 
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We find that the LSSA is not ambiguous, and that the responsibility of the ISIF to 
assume exclusive responsibility for the payment of statutory benefits for total and 
permanent disability does not begin until after the expiration of 250 weeks 
subsequent to October 1, 2013 (See p. 12 of 10.6.15 Order on Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling). 
The Industrial Commission's conclusion that the document is not ambiguous does not 
make any sense. If the document was not ambiguous, then application of the phrase "subject to 
the credit" would not lead to 2 completely different outcomes when applied to each Defendant 
and deprive the Claimant of 160 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits from week 90 
to week 250. 
The Commission found also found that the interpretation of the Compensation 
Agreement suggested by Petitioner was not supported by the language of the document: 
We do not believe the LSSA contemplates the outcome suggested by Petitioner. 
Paragraph 11 of the LSSA clearly contemplates that despite whatever credit may 
be taken by the Employer, ISIF's responsibility to pay 100% of Petitioner's 
statutory benefits does not commence until the expiration of 250 weeks 
subsequent to October 1, 2013 (See p. 13 of 10.6.15 Order On Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling). 
The outcome suggested by the Petitioner is that the Compensation Agreement requires 
the Defendants to pay Claimant his statutory total and permanent disability benefits at the 
statutory rate of 45% of the A WSW beginning on 10.1.13 and continuing each month thereafter 
for the balance of Petitioner's life just like the document states: 
Beginning on October 1, 2013, Claimant is entitled to be paid total and 
permanent disability benefits at 45% of the then prevailing average weekly state 
wage pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 72-408 and 72-409 (See Yl l of stipulation) 
(italics supplied). 
The parties represent and advise the Commission that the benefits provided for 
and to be paid hereunder are the full measure of benefits Claimant would be 
entitled to receive if this matter proceeded to hearing and Defendants were found 
to be liable for future medical care causally related to the industrial injury, for 
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permanent partial impairment benefits and for total and permanent disability 
income benefits pursuant to law. (See ,r20 of the stipulation approved by the 
Commission in its 6.26.14 Order) (italics supplied). 
Since the outcome suggested by Petitioner is expressly stated as the fundamental purpose 
of the agreement, it is difficult to fathom how the Commission can reach the conclusion that the 
document does not contemplate the outcome advanced by Petitioner. The Commission's 
interpretation of the Compensation Agreement is not only unreasonable because it completely 
overlooks the stated purpose of he agreement, it is also unreasonable because the Commission 
fails to apply the phrase "subject to the credit" to the ISIF's payment obligation. This is a clear 
misinterpretation of the agreement. The plain language of paragraph 11 clearly states that the 
ISIF' s obligation to pay statutory total and permanent disability benefits is subject to the credit: 
At the expiration of said 250 week period, subiect to the credit discussed in 
paragraph 12, below, the ISIF will pay Claimant his full statutory income 
benefits, said amount being 45% of the then prevailing average state weekly 
wage, until Claimant's death (See !11 of agreement) (italics supplied). 
When the phrase "subject to the credit" is used to qualify or explain the ISIF' s payment 
obligation, it can only mean that the phrase accelerates the commencement of the ISIF's payment 
obligation from week 250 down to week 90. Otherwise, the phrase is meaningless and mere 
surplusage. As a basic matter of contract construction, the phrase "subject to the credit" should 
be applied to both Defendants consistently and the Commission should enter an Order On 
Reconsideration which clearly states that the ISIP has an obligation to pay total and permanent 
disability benefits to the Claimant at the statutory rate of 45% of the A WSW beginning 90 weeks 
after 10.1.13 because its payment obligation was "subject to the credit" discussed in paragraph 
12. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a general concept, the Claimant understands why the finality principle embodied in 
Idaho Code §72-718 is important to the orderly administration of justice. However, the finality 
principle embodied in Idaho Code §72-718 and the doctrine of res judicata can only be applied to 
valid final judgments. When the Industrial Commission acts beyond its limited jurisdiction and 
approves an invalid agreement that grants an illegal credit that is not authorized by Idaho Code 
§72-408 or Idaho Code §72-409, then we are not dealing with a valid final judgment and the 
principle of finality must yield to the Commission's obligation to set aside an invalid agreement 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318 and Idaho Code §72-711: 
A reading of the findings and conclusions indicates the Commission was 
erroneously under the impression that the doctrine of res judicata precludes any 
consideration of the applicability ofl.C. § 72-719(3) in the absence of either fraud 
or change of condition. Res judicata prevents only the relitigation of matters 
finally decided in an earlier decision of the Commission. Here the statute clearly 
over-rides that concept of finality, permitting the Commission to reopen its earlier 
decision if it fmds it necessary to do so to correct a manifest injustice. Banzhaf v. 
Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700, 703, 662 P.2d 1144, 1177 (1983). 
Idaho Code §72-318 specifically states that any agreement which relieves the Employer 
of its obligation to pay full compensation or requires the Claimant to waive his right to full 
compensation is invalid. Idaho Code §72-711 clearly states that the Industrial Commission can 
only approve compensation agreements which conform to the provisions of the Act. These 
concepts, which require the Industrial Commission to declare invalid agreements that violate the 
Act void, must override the concept of finality. 
Even if the Commission disregards its obligation to set aside those provisions of an 
invalid agreement which grant an illegal credit not authorized by any provision of the workers' 
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compensation Act, the Commission should consistently apply the ambiguous phrase "subject to 
the credit" to both Defendants and require the ISIF to begin paying Claimant the full measure of 
his total and permanent disability benefits at 45% of the A WSW 90 weeks after 10.1.13 pursuant 
to Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 and paragraphs 11 and 12 of the parties' 
Compensation Agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of October, 2015. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By:]~ 
RICK b,l(ALLAS 
Attorney for Petitioner/ Claimant 
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GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
LC. 15-000107 
(2005-50 I 080) 
ISIF RESPONSE TO 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
OCTOBER 6, 2015 ORDER ON 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
RULING 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIP") by 
and through undersigned counsel of record and hereby responds to Petitioner's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Brief in Support thereof. 
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Initially, it must be noted that the Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
offers nothing new by way of analysis or authority in support of Claimant's position. The 
Motion for Reconsideration and Brief in Support simply rehash the arguments presented 
in the Petition for Declaratory Ruling, all of which were fully addressed by the Industrial 
Commission in its Order denying the Petition. 
Claimant continues to rehash the "credit" argument with respect to the ISIP 
liability. As the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants unambiguously 
provides, and as the Commission held in its Order on Petition for Declaration Ruling, the 
ISIF liability to Claimant included the differential between the Claimant's statutory 
disability benefit rate of 45% and the prevailing average weekly state wage for year of 
injury owed by the Employer and Surety pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and §72-409. 
This is a very rare occurrence in ISIP liability cases. Because the date of Claimant's 
MMI was 9 years from the date of his industrial injury, the increase in the benefit rate 
payable even to a 45% rate Claimant was in excess of the 2004 55% of the average 
weekly state wage rate. Accordingly, and beginning with the MMI date of October 1, 
2013, the ISIF was liable for, and acknowledged in the Stipulation, that it would pay to 
Claimant the differential rate throughout the 250 weeks of the agreed upon obligation to 
the Employer and Surety. The "credit" therefore recognized that the 160 week credit to 
the Surety for impairment paid did not eliminate the ISIP liability for the differential 
during the 250 weeks of total and permanent disability benefits which were the liability 
of the Surety. 
The Commission correctly held in its Order that the ISIP liability for the full 
measure of Claimant's statutory benefits would not and did not accrue until the expiration 
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of the entire 250 weeks apportioned to the Employer and Surety. The Claimant's 
arguments to the contrary are devoid of cogent analysis or supporting authority. 
The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied on the grounds and for the 
reasons set forth in the Commission's Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed 
October 6, 2015. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2015. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
~J-r~ 
Kenneth L. Mallei 
Attorney for ISIP 
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Attorney for Claimant 
JonM. Bauman 
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Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Defendant ISIP 
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251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Bauman - ISB #2989 
Attorney for Defendants, Employer and Surety 
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Defendants Employer and Surety, by and through Elam & Burke, P.A., their attorneys of 
record, hereby respond as follows to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Industrial 
Commission's October 6, 2015 Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling dated October 23, 2015 
("Motion for Reconsideration"). 
The Motion for Reconsideration is not well taken. Pursuant to Rule 3, J.R.P., a motion 
"shall ... set forth the relief or order sought." The Motion for Reconsideration merely asks the 
Industrial Commission to reconsider its ruling of October 6, 2015 on the Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling. The motion fails to set forth the relief or order sought. 
The Motion for Reconsideration fails to raise any new arguments not already raised 
previously. The Industrial Commission has held on numerous occasions that it is not inclined to 
re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply because the case was not 
resolved in a party's favor. Oakes v. Coeur d'Alene School District No. 271, 2015 IIC 0034 
(08/07/2015); Federko v. Sun Valley Co., 2011 IIC 0034 (06/03/2011). 
The Motion for Reconsideration, like Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling and 
supporting briefs, asks the Industrial Commission to reopen a case that was dismissed with 
prejudice before the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 
157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 (2014). Petitioner did not seek reconsideration or appeal from 
the Industrial Commission's decision approving the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against 
Defendants. In its Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, the Industrial Commission set forth 
cogent reasons why Petitioner's request should be denied. Petitioner offers no new legal or 
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factual matter that would call into question the Industrial Commission's ruling or the basis for 
that ruling. 
Petitioner also argues that the Industrial Commission should retroactively apply the 
decision in Corgatelli to invalidate the Stipulation for Entry of A ward Against Defendants. As 
the Industrial Commission pointed out, however, "We conclude that there is yet no way to 
retroactively apply the rule of Corgatelli to past LSSAs and past decisions of the Commission. 
The Commission would do little else but revisit many thousands of long-resolved claims were 
that the case." Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, p. 12. Petitioner does not assert any 
basis for reconsidering these assertions because none exists. 
Nevertheless, Petitioner has resorted to circular argument by suggesting that somehow, 
the Corgatelli decision, if applied retroactively, would preclude the Industrial Commission from 
approving the Stipulation for Entry of A ward Against Defendants. There is no limit to the 
number of possibilities one can imagine if one were allowed to travel backward in time. Not 
content with this flawed reasoning, however, Petitioner also appears to suggest, once again, that 
somehow the Employer and Surety and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund had advance 
knowledge of how the Idaho Supreme Court would rule in Corgatelli. The suggestion is 
unreasonable, based as it is on nothing but conjecture. In fact, the undersigned had no idea what 
issues the Idaho Supreme Court would ultimately address in Corgatelli, and no idea how those 
issues would be resolved. The Industrial Commission noted that "it must be acknowledged that 
had the parties been pre-aware of the holding in that case [Corgatelli], the LSSA would look 
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different than the one approved by the Commission." Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, 
p. 11. 
Defendants Employer and Surety concur in the ISIF Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's October 6, 2015 Order on Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration shoul 
Respectfully submitted this* day ofNovembe, 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
V. 
Claimant, 
Petitioner herein, 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Respondents herein. 
IC 15-000107 
(2005-501080) 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
FILED 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On October 6, 2015, the Commission entered its Order on Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling. On October 23, 2015, Petitioner filed his timely motion for reconsideration, with 
supporting memoranda. Defendants Employer/Surety and ISIP filed timely responses. For the 
reasons set forth in more detail below, the Commission declines to reconsider its October 6, 2015 
Order. 
In its October 6, 2015 Decision, the Commission observed that while the provisions of 
Idaho Code§ 72-719 do afford limited opportunities to re-visit an award of the Commission, that 
section was not relevant to resolution of the instant matter since the provisions of Idaho Code 
§ 72-719 do not apply where there has been a settlement pursuant to the provisions of Idaho 
Code§ 72-404. (See Idaho Code§ 72-719(4)). Idaho Code§ 72-404 provides: 
Whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest of all parties, 
the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the 
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the 
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payment of one or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the 
comm1ss10n. 
Such agreements, commonly referred to as lump sum settlement agreements, contemplate the 
compromise of a claim by the payment of "one or more lump sums". Here, the agreement at 
issue does not contemplate the payment of one or more lump sums in compromise of 
Defendants' liability. Rather, the agreement contemplates the payment of all benefits to which 
Claimant would be entitled as though adjudged permanently and totally disabled by the 
Commission. The issue resolved by the agreement was not whether Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled, and not whether the ISIF bears some responsibility for the payment of 
total and permanent disability benefits. Rather, the issue resolved by the agreement was how 
that responsibility should be apportioned between the Employer and the ISIP. The agreement is 
silent as to whether it is submitted to the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 72-404 or Idaho Code § 72-711. Likewise, the Commission's order approving the 
settlement is silent as to whether it is approved pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-404, Idaho Code § 
72-711, or some other authority. Petitioner argues that since the agreement does not call for the 
payment of a lump sum or sums, the agreement is more appropriately characterized as a 
"compensation agreement" under Idaho Code § 72-711. Assuming, without deciding, that 
Petitioner is correct in this characterization, the Commission concludes that this would not 
change the outcome in this matter. 
First, even though Idaho Code § 72-711 compensation agreements may be re-visited 
pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 72-719(c) (Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9,644 P.2d 311 
(1982); Banzhafv. Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983)), the fact remains that 
the limited review afforded by the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-719 is only available within 
five years following the date of the accident giving rise to the claim. The stipulation of the 
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parties reflects that the subject accident occurred on November 9, 2004. Therefore, per Idaho 
Code § 72-719, the time within which to challenge an award of the Commission for change of 
condition, fraud, or to correct a manifest injustice, has long passed. Idaho Code § 72-719 cannot 
disturb the finality of the Commission's June 26, 2014 Order approving the settlement 
agreement, even if that agreement is characterized as a "compensation agreement" under Idaho 
Code § 72-711. 
Next, the Commission concludes that even if it be assumed that the settlement agreement 
is best characterized as an Idaho Code § 72-711 compensation agreement, the agreement would 
not receive different treatment under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-318 than it would if it is 
more appropriately characterized as an Idaho Code§ 72-404 agreement. The agreement does not 
waive Petitioner's rights to compensation under the Act. Rather, by the subject agreement, 
Defendants and Petitioner merely agreed to resolve the specific claim for benefits at issue in this 
case. See Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005). Further, we find that if 
the agreement is best characterized as an Idaho Code § 72-711 agreement, it still passes muster 
under Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009), 
vis-a-vis the ISIF. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that there is specific statutory language in Idaho Code § 72-711 
which imposes an additional obligation on the Commission which is not imposed by the 
provisions ofldaho Code § 72-404. Idaho Code § 72-711 provides: 
If the employer and the afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to 
compensation under this law, a memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with 
the commission, and, if approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all 
purposes be an award by the commission and be enforceable under the provisions 
of section 72-735, unless modified as provided in section 72-719. An agreement 
shall be approved by the commission only when the terms conform to the 
provisions of this law. 
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Therefore, where the terms of the compensation agreement do not "conform to the provisions of 
this law", the Commission is without authority to approve such a settlement. Petitioner argues 
that as illustrated by Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) the 
"credit" taken in the agreement is illegal under Idaho workers' compensation law and has been 
illegal ever since the statutory scheme was enacted. Therefore, the Commission was not 
authorized to approve the settlement in question, even though the settlement was approved prior 
the issuance of Corgatelli, supra. We disagree with the premise that it has always been contrary 
to Idaho law to allow the type of credit at issue in this case. As the Commission went to some 
lengths to explain in the Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, it is implicit in the landmark 
decision of Carey v. Clearwater Road Dep 't, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) that the type of 
credit at issue in this case, is not only allowed, but anticipated by the apportionment scheme 
adopted by the Court in that decision. While the Court has now ruled that such "credits" are 
inapposite to its construction of the statutory scheme, and while we are constrained to apply that 
construction prospectively, we decline to do so retroactively. Nor has Petitioner cited the 
Commission to any authority which would support the retroactive application of the Corgatelli 
Court's construction of the statutory scheme. Finally, it is possible that the Corgatelli Court did 
not intend the broad interpretation that the Commission has given to that case. For this reason as 
well, we decline to apply it in the fashion urged by Petitioner, without receiving further direction 
from the Court. An appeal of this decision would afford Petitioner the opportunity to test 
whether the Commission's interpretation of Corgatelli is correct, and if so, whether the 
Commission has erred in failing to retroactively apply that rule not only to this settlement 
agreement, but to all past settlement agreements and decisions of the Commission which endorse 
the taking of a similar credit. 
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For the reasons stated above the Commission continues to adhere to its original decision. 
'7 c:;th /11 - J -DATED this _c<.,_0_ day of iv CJ W/Ji.JJ--!./1 , 2015. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Rd~=-ff 
( . 
Thdmas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
5t::)"" , ,, I ,. I hereby certify that on the CX, day of tJo\J-l/u...tLI// , 2015, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 EPARKBLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
JONMBAUMAN 
PO BOX 1539 
BOISE ID 83701-1539 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 Zil1S DEC 3 ! A 10: OC 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
q[CEIYEO . 
!!-IDUSTt~IAL CLMM!S5l0h 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
E-mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
Attorney for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant / Petitioner / Appellant, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURNACE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants / Respondents. 
Davis/ Claimant/ Petitioner I Appellant's Notice of Appeal 
I.C. No. 2005 - 501080 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Filing Fee: $94.00 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS / RESPONDENTS, HAMMACK 
MANAGEMENT, INC., AND THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, AND 
THEIR ATTORNEY, JON BAUMAN, AND TO THE STATE OF IDAHO 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, 
KENNETH MALLEA, AND TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Claimant / Petitioner / Appellant, Gary Davis, appeals against the above 
named Defendants / Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court against the Industrial 
Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling and 11.25.15 Order 
Denying Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration. 
2. The Claimant / Petitioner / Appellant has the right to appeal from the above described orders 
because the Orders described above are final and appealable Orders pursuant to Rule 11 ( d) 
I.AR. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
(a) Did the Industrial Commission exceed the limited jurisdiction granted to it by the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Act when it entered its 6.26.14 Order granting Employer an 
invalid credit for PPI benefits previously paid against its obligation to pay Claimant the 
full measure of his total and permanent disability benefits even though such a credit is not 
authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409? 
(b) Did the Industrial Commission err by not applying the holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, 
Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) retroactively to its 6.26.14 Order of Approval 
and Discharge and declaring the PPI credit granted to Employer void? 
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( c) Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that its 6.26.14 Order should not be 
declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 even though it granted 
Employer an invalid PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code 
§72-409 which did not conform to the provisions of the workers' compensation act? 
(d) Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that its 6.26.14 Order should not be 
declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(1) even though it granted 
Employer an invalid PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code 
§72-409 which relieved Employer in whole or in part from its liability to pay the 
Claimant the full measure of his statutory total and permanent disability benefits? 
(e) Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that its 6.26.14 Order should not be 
declared void and set aside pursuant to Idaho Code §72-318(2) even though it granted 
Employer an invalid PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code 
§72-409 which required the Claimant to unlawfully waive his right to receive the full 
measure of his statutory total and permanent disability benefits? 
(f) Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that the "subject to the credit" language 
of the stipulation was not ambiguous when it defined the date when the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund is obligated to begin paying Claimant the full measure of his statutory 
total and permanent disability benefits? 
(g) Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that the Claimant is not entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees from Employer and ISIP pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 even 
though both Employer and the ISIP contested the Claimant's claim for the full measure of 
his total and permanent disability benefits without reasonable grounds in direct violation 
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of the express language of the stipulation and Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-
409? 
4. No portion of the record has been sealed by order of the Commission or a Court. 
5. The Claimant/ Petitioner/ Respondent does not request a transcript of the proceedings 
below because the Industrial Commission's 6.26.14 Order of Approval and Discharge 
was entered by the Industrial Commission based on a Stipulation For Entry of Award 
Against Defendants and there was no hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
6. The Claimant I Petitioner/ Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
Industrial Commission's/ agency's record in addition to those automatically included under 
Rule 28, I.A.R: 
(a) The 6.26.14 Stipulation For Entry of Award Against Defendants and the corresponding 
Order of Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial Commission on 6.26.14; 
(b) Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 2.26.15 Petition For Declaratory Ruling; 
(c) Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 2.26.15 Affidavit In Support of Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling; 
(d) Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 2.26.15 Memorandum in Support of Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling including Exhibits 1 - 5; 
(e) Defendant Employer's 3.11.15 Objection and Response to Claimant's Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling Which Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation For Entry of Award 
Against Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge entered by the Industrial 
Commission on 6.26.14; 
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(:t) Defendant ISIF's 3.11.15 Limited Appearance To Challenge Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
and Service of Process; 
(g) Claimant/ Petitioner I Appellant's 3.17.15 Consolidated Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling; 
(h) The Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling; 
(i) Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 10.23.15 Motion For Reconsideration of the Industrial 
Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling; 
(j) Claimant/ Petitioner/ Appellant's 10.23.15 Brief in Support of Motion For 
Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For 
Declaratory Ruling; 
(k) Defendant ISIF's 11.2.15 Response To Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration of the 
Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order On Petition For Declaratory Ruling; 
(I) Defendant Employer's 11.4.15 Response To Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration of 
the Industrial Commission's 10.6.15 Order on Petition For Declaratory Ruling; and, 
(m) Industrial Commission's 11.25.15 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion For 
Reconsideration. 
7. Claimant I Petitioner I Appellant requests that Exhibits 1 - 5 submitted with the 
Claimant's Memorandum In Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling be included in 
the Industrial Commission's administrative agency's record on appeal. 
8. I certify: 
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(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal does not have to be served on any reporter because the 
parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled and the Industrial 
Commission did not have to conduct a hearing so there is no transcript to order. 
(b) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of December, 2015. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By: ___ --==:;-----"---~~'-----::;t,'~---
RICK D. KALLAS -Attom~~;;J 
Attorney for Claimant 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of December, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of Claimant / Petitioner I Appellant's Notice of Appeal by the method indicated 
below upon the following persons: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
78 SW 5th Ave., Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam & Burke 
251 E. Front Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Davis/ Claimant I Petitioner/ Appellant's Notice of Appeal 
[ X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile @ 208.888.2789 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 208.384.5844 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant-Appellant, SUPREME COURT NO. 
----V. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., Employer, 
and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, 
and STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
OF GARY DA VIS 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission Chairman R.D. Maynard presiding. 
Case Number: IC 15-000107 (IC 2005-501080) 
Order Appealed from: ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING 
ENTERED OCTOBER 6, 2015 and ORDER DENYING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ENTERED NOVEMBER 25, 2015 
Attorney for Appellant: RICK D. KALLAS 
1031 E. PARK BOULEVARD 
BOISE, ID 83712-7722 
Attorney for Respondents: JON M. BAUMAN 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Reporter/Transcript: 
Dated: 
P.O. BOX 1539 
BOISE, ID 83701 
KENNETH L. MALLEA 
P.O.BOX857 
MERIDIAN, ID 83680 
GARY DAVIS, Claimant 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC. and IDAHO STATE 
INSURANCE FUND and STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
DECEMBER 31, 2015 
$94.00 SC Fee paid & $100 Industfja,l,CQJIBllission deposit paid 
,,,''coMMiss. '',,, 
No reporter; no hearing h 0 °'-~.th~,tt~"o .. nd no transcript. 
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CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL 
I, DENA K. BURKE , the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of 
the NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED DECEMBER 31, 2015; THE COMMISSION'S 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING ENTERED OCTOBER 6, 2015 
and ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ENTERED NOVEMBER 25, 2015, herein, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 
15-000107 (2005-50 I 080) for Claimant GARY DA VIS. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official 
seal of said Commission this 31 sr day of DECEMBER, 2015. 
CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL - GARY DA VIS - 1 
150 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 SW 5th A venue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Fax: (208) 888-2789 
.... ,. 
Iii 1i JAN I 3 p r: r::, 
V oJ 
Email: klm@mallealaw.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 2397 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
* * * * * * * * 
GARY DAVIS, 
Claimant/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety/Respondent, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-
Appellant. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - I 
LC. No. 2005-501080 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT, GARY DAVIS, AND 
HIS ATTORNEY, RICK D. KALLAS, 1031 E. Park Boulevard, Boise, ID 83712 AND 
RESPONDENTS HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC. and STATE INSURANCE 
FUND AND THEIR ATTORNEY, JON BAUMAN, P.O. Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701 
AND THE CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named cross-appellant, STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, appeals against the above-named cross-respondent, 
GARY DAVIS, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho Industrial Commission's 
October 6, 2015 Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling and November 25, 2015 Order 
Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
2. That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the judgments or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to I.A.R., Rule 11 ( d). 
3. Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the Industrial Commission had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed in this case? 
b. Whether a Petition for Declaratory Ruling under JRP 15 may allow 
a party to subsequently challenge by appeal the merits of a stipulated settlement and order 
of approval where no motion for reconsideration or appeal had previously been taken? 
c. Whether a final order on a petition for declaratory ruling may 
extend the time for appeal on the merits of a case that had been dismissed with prejudice 
16 months earlier? 
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d. Does a party have the right by application of JRP 15, to directly 
appeal a ruling in a subsequent proceeding with the same parties and issues that were 
previously dismissed with prejudice? 
e. Does JRP 15, as applied in this case, violate I.C. §72-718? 
4. The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
Industrial Commission's/agency's record in addition to those automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by the appellant in the initial notice of appeal: 
None. 
5. I certify: 
a. That the cross-appellant is exempt from paying any clerk's fee or 
filing fee because cross-appellant is an agency of the State ofldaho. 
b. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated: January / J, 2016 2~~ 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/1,-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the K_ day of January, 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Rick D. Kallas 
1031 East Park Boulevard 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Attorney for Claimant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Employer/Surety 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Appellant/Cross Respondent, SUPREME COURT NO. 
V. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, Surety, 
CERTIFICATE OF 
CROSS APPEAL 
Respondents/Cross Respondents, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Industrial Commission, 
RD. Maynard, Chairman presiding 
IC 15-000107 (2015-501080) 
Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, filed 
October 6, 2015 and Order Denying Petitioner's 
Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 25, 
2015. (Copies of these documents were sent to the 
Court on December 31, 2015 with the Ceritificate of 
Appeal) 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross Respondent: Rick D. Kallas 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712-7722 
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Attorney for Respondents/ 
Cross Respondents: 
Jon M. Bauman 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross Appellant: Kenneth L. Mallea 
PO Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Cross Appeal By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Cross/ Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Dated: 
Respondent/Cross Appellant, ISIF 
Appellant/Cross Respondent, Gary Davis and 
Respondents/Cross Respondents, Hammack 
Management, Inc., Employer, and Idaho State 
Insurance Fund, Surety. 
January 13, 2016 
The Cross Appellant is exempt from paying fees. 
No hearing was held in this matter. 
January 15, 2016 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Cross-Appeal, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 
15-000107 (2015-501080) for Gary Davis. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 15th day of January, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 43863 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. 
DATED this 8th day of February, 2016. 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY DAVIS, 
Appellant/Cross Respondent, 
V. 
HAMMACK MANAGEMENT, INC., Employer, 
and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Respondents/Cross Respondents, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
TO: Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Courts; 
SUPREME COURT NO. 43863 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
Rick D. Kallas for the Appellant/Cross Respondent; 
Jon M. Bauman for the Respondents/Cross Respondents; and 
Kenneth Mallea for the Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross Respondent: 
Rick D. Kallas 
1031 E Park Blvd 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Attorney for Respondents/Cross Respondents: 
Jon M. Bauman 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
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Attorney for Respondent/Cross Appellant: 
Kenneth Mallea 
PO Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the 
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this 8th day of February, 2015. 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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